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STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY AT 50: FOUR HISTORIES 
Kyle Graham
*
 
ABSTRACT 
This article offers four different perspectives on the strict products-liability 
“revolution” that climaxed a half-century ago. One of these narratives relates the 
prevailing assessment of how this innovation coalesced and spread across the 
states. The three alternative histories introduced by this article both challenge 
and complement the standard account by viewing the shift toward strict products 
liability through populist, practical, and contingent lenses, respectively. The first 
of these narratives considers the contributions that plaintiffs and their counsel 
made toward this change in the law. The second focuses upon how certain types 
of formerly common, but now moribund, products cases framed the argument for 
strict products liability as a superior alternative to negligence. The third 
examines why tort law eclipsed warranty as the principal doctrinal forum for 
products-liability reform. These non-canonical accounts have been obscured, this 
article concludes, due to blind spots and biases that recur across descriptions of 
doctrinal development in tort law.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Depending upon when the clock started to run, strict products liability 
recently observed, or is now celebrating, its fiftieth birthday. In 1960, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court breached the walls of the “citadel” of privity in Henningsen v. Bloomfield 
Motors, Inc., a warranty case.1 Three years later, the California Supreme Court formally 
adopted a tort theory of recovery for products liability, regardless of fault, in 
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.2 And 1964 witnessed the final approval of the 
long-awaited Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A, which announced a basic 
framework of rules to govern strict products liability in tort.3 Today, these three 
events are widely recognized as touchstone moments in a products-liability 
“revolution”4 that swept the nation and has been described as “the most rapid and 
altogether spectacular overturn of an established rule in the entire history of the law 
of torts.”5   
The swift ascendance of strict products liability, whether framed in tort or 
warranty, has prompted thoughtful examinations of how and why this doctrine 
coalesced and gained acceptance. As to the “how,” these accounts all drape around a 
handful of trends and events that represent generally accepted milestones in the 
development of products liability. Meanwhile, two explanations have come to frame 
the “why” component of the discussion. The first focuses upon the roles played by a 
select group of judges and academics in molding and proselytizing the core concepts 
that underlie strict liability to the consumer.6 Another account concentrates less on 
                                                          
1 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). The “citadel” metaphor for the 
privity requirement was coined by Justice Cardozo in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 445 
(N.Y. 1931).  
2 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). 
3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Though formally published in 1965, this section 
had been approved by the members of the American Law Institute in May 1964. Friday Afternoon 
Session, May 22, 1964, 41 A.L.I. PROC. 324, 375 (1965). This provision remains perhaps the most-cited 
of all Restatement sections. See Henry J. Reske, Experts Tackle Torts Restatement, ABA J., Aug. 1992, at 
18, 18 (observing that Section 402A “has been cited by courts far more than any other part of any 
ALI restatement”). 
4 Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Deacademification of Tort Theory, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 59, 60 
(1999). 
5 William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 793–94 
(1966). See also Editor’s Scratch Pad, AM. TRIAL LAWYERS ASS’N BULL., Mar. 1965, at 38, 39  
(“Sometimes progress in tort law comes not in isolated individual advances but in onrushing 
battalions. This is surely true of the yeasty field of products liability where development of the law 
since World War II has been spectacular & moved with lightning-like speed.”). 
6 E.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 168 (1980) (“The 
dramatic rise of strict liability theory in defective products cases between the 1940s and 1970 furnishes 
a striking example of the way in which tort law has been shaped by the interactions of influential 
scholars and visible appellate judges.”); Robert C. Bird & Roger J. Smythe, Social Network Analysis and 
the Diffusion of the Strict Liability Rule for Manufacturing Defects, 1963 – 1987, 37 LAW & SOC. INQ. 565 
(2013); James R. Hackney, Jr., The Intellectual Origins of American Strict Products Liability: A Case Study in 
American Pragmatic Instrumentalism, 39 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 443 (1995); David Owen, The Intellectual 
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the contributions of individuals than on the environment that allegedly inspired 
them. This description assigns motive force to broad, vaguely defined economic, 
political, and cultural trends that, by the middle of the twentieth century, supposedly 
aligned to make strict products liability inevitable.7  
Repetition of these accounts over the years has tended to marginalize other 
aspects of strict products liability’s emergence. As this doctrine enters its second 
half-century, this article excavates its foundations and identifies three hidden 
histories buried under the prevailing dialogue.8 These additional narratives 
complement and challenge the existing literature by offering populist, practical, and 
contingent accounts, respectively, of strict products liability’s emergence: three new 
lenses through which to view this change in the law.9 The first of these stories 
concerns the heretofore overlooked role of consumers and the emerging plaintiff’s 
personal-injury bar in generating the raw material—cases—for the products-liability 
revolution. The second considers the practical problems that drove mid-century 
courts toward strict products liability, with a focus upon the issues presented by 
certain recurring case types that were prominent at the time of strict products 
liability’s inception, but are now almost extinct. And the third examines the element 
of chance associated with the development and adoption of a theory of strict 
products liability framed in tort, as opposed to a solution more closely tethered to 
the previously prevailing language of warranty.  
The first of these supplemental narratives relates how consumers and their 
attorneys provided the momentum for the products-liability avalanche. Accounts of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Development of Modern Product Liability Law: A Comment on Priest’s View of the Cathedral’s Foundation, 14 J. 
LEG. STUD. 529 (1985); George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the 
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985). See also Jane Stapleton, Bugs in 
Anglo-American Products Liability, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1225, 1229 (2002) (“Section 402A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts . . . was a top-down law reform motivated, not by social or forensic pressures, but 
by the enthusiasm of a small group of Legal Realists that saw the opportunity to make what they saw 
as a small win-win change to legal entitlements.”). 
7 E.g., Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. 
L. REV. 601, 601–03 (1992). 
8 The phrase “hidden histories” is borrowed from JOHN FABIAN WITT, PATRIOTS AND 
COSMOPOLITANS: HIDDEN HISTORIES OF AMERICAN LAW (2007).  
9 For a discussion of torts scholarship representative of a “contingency” approach, see John Fabian 
Witt, Contingency, Immanence, and Inevitability in the Law of Accidents, 1 J. TORT LAW 1, 16–34 (2007). 
Professor Witt also delved into the contingencies associated with the development of modern 
American accident law in JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED 
WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW (2006) and John 
Fabian Witt, Toward a New History of American Accident Law: Classical Tort Law and the Cooperative First-
Party Insurance Movement, 114 HARV. L. REV. 690 (2001). Meanwhile, the word “practical,” as used here, 
signifies that this supplemental narrative is less concerned with whether and how elites kept the law in 
line with broader social trends (i.e., a broad “functionalist” narrative), than with how a larger cast of 
judges may have viewed strict products liability as a fix for more mundane problems that recurred on 
their dockets. For a discussion and critique of functionalist legal histories, see Robert W. Gordon, 
Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984).  
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doctrinal change tend to dwell upon the contributions of judges and academics, 
whose contributions are neatly captured in decisions, articles, and citations. 
Individual plaintiffs and their attorneys, meanwhile, normally attract attention only 
when associated with leading cases. But the lawsuits that led to the development and 
adoption of strict products liability did not appear out of thin air. Plaintiffs had to 
recognize an injury, connect their harm to a product, and appreciate the prospect of 
recovery; lawyers had to be willing to take these cases and present them effectively. 
As it happens, strict products liability unfurled in synch with evolving claim 
consciousness among prospective plaintiffs and enhanced sophistication of personal-
injury counsel. Members of the public appreciated the existence of some products 
claims before they discerned others; predictably, the law followed a similar path. 
Meanwhile, in the years following World War II, plaintiffs’ counsel came to perceive 
products liability as an ennobling and potentially lucrative area of practice, and 
improved knowledge-sharing networks among these attorneys made these cases less 
daunting to pursue. These conditions ultimately produced the lawsuits that provided 
the nation’s courts with ample fodder for a doctrinal shift.  
The second narrative explains why strict products liability was endorsed not 
only by Dean William Prosser and Justice Roger Traynor, but also by the C. William 
O’Neills10 and Hamilton S. Burnetts11 of the legal world. This story considers how 
certain types of products lawsuits made a practical case for products liability by 
framing the argument for this innovation and auditioning it during its gestational 
phase. Specifically, this article focuses upon the doctrinal pressures created by a 
particular type of products-liability lawsuit, the so-called “bottle case.” Origin stories 
of strict products liability must account for Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno,12 
the California Supreme Court case in which Justice Traynor used a lawsuit over a 
broken soda bottle to sketch the arguments for strict liability.13 Most commentators 
appreciate the prescience of Traynor’s opinion; fewer recognize the ubiquity of the 
fact pattern he addressed. Between the 1940s and 1960s, exploding or bursting 
beverage bottles probably generated more products-liability lawsuits than did any 
other single consumer good. These “bottle cases” also placed more strain on generic 
negligence principles than did most other products cases. As these lawsuits mounted, 
so too did the argument for a strict-liability approach. Yet these contributions toward 
                                                          
10 C. William O’Neill was an associate justice on the Ohio Supreme Court, and wrote the majority 
opinion in Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 218 N.E.2d 185 (Oh. 1966), in which the court adopted 
strict products liability in tort.  
11 Hamilton S. Burnett was a Chief Justice of the Tennessee Supreme Court and the author of Ford 
Motor Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966), in which that court adopted strict products liability 
in tort. No disrespect is intended toward either Justice O’Neill or Justice Burnett by referencing them; 
the point is simply to underscore that strict products liability appealed to more than a handful of 
academics and similarly minded judges.  
12 150 P.2d 436 (1944). 
13 Id. at 440–44 (Traynor, J., concurring).  
5 
 
the strict products-liability revolution are today forgotten. With bottle cases now 
rare, it is easy to underestimate how they once may have weighed on minds of even 
relatively conservative judges.  
Finally, this article considers the contingencies associated with the 
ascendance of a strict-liability theory rooted firmly in tort (as packaged by the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A), as opposed to an approach grounded 
in warranty. Strict products liability in tort spread across the country like wildfire. It 
took less than 25 years from the Greenman decision onward for 45 states to ground 
their consumer protections in this new branch of tort law. Yet more than a quarter-
century after Wyoming became the last state to clamber aboard the bandwagon, five 
states still prefer to cast their enhanced consumer protections in the language of 
warranty. As discussed herein, these holdouts underscore two fortuitous 
circumstances associated with the adoption of a tort approach to strict products 
liability. First, this doctrine capitalized upon a period of transition in warranty law, 
which otherwise might have fully absorbed the energies for doctrinal change. 
Second, a critical mass of states adopted strict products liability during a brief 
window in which a preemption argument premised on states’ contemporaneous 
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code had not fully matured. Had 
circumstances aligned only slightly differently, strict products liability—to the extent 
that it is truly strict at all—easily could have followed a somewhat different doctrinal 
route in many jurisdictions, one that relied principally on warranty, as opposed to 
tort. 
This article proceeds as follows. This Introduction is followed by Section II, 
which offers a standard retelling of the path toward strict products liability, and a 
summary of the prevailing explanations for this transition. Sections III through V 
then elaborate upon the three narratives described above. Finally, Section VI relates 
how the obscurity of these stories owes to biases and blind spots in the composition 
and consolidation of histories of doctrinal development in tort law. As others have 
noted, accounts of doctrinal movement commonly overlook the groundwork laid by 
prospective plaintiffs and their attorneys; ignore case tropes as a profitable unit of 
analysis; and downplay the fortuitous circumstances associated with the diffusion of 
almost every “successful” new idea in the law.14 But by pulling these subjects out of 
the shadows, one can better understand some of the complexities inherent in the 
processes of doctrinal change.  
                                                          
14 See Gordon, supra note 9, at 71 (opining that “Realist functionalism almost unconsciously reserves 
even what it believes to be the very marginal opportunities for legal influence on the direction of 
social change to an elite of policymakers: Mass movements and local struggles are not ordinarily 
thought of as makers of legal change,” and that “essential working assumptions [of this approach] 
misleadingly objectify history, making highly contingent developments appear to have been 
necessary.”).  
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II. THE CONVENTIONAL NARRATIVE: LANDMARK CASES, ELITES, AND TRENDS 
From the first state to adopt it through the forty-fifth, strict products liability 
in tort swept through the nation’s courts faster than any other major doctrinal shift 
in the history of modern tort law. But the rapid adoption of strict products liability 
came only after a very long incubation period. This gestational era incorporated a 
series of signal trends and events for which all origin stories must account. Following 
is a fairly conventional retelling of these developments.  
A. A Brief History of Strict Products Liability  
 
1. Winterbottom and the Privity Requirement 
The first landmark event in the history of modern products liability is the 
decision of the English Court of Exchequer in Winterbottom v. Wright.15 Decided in 
1842, Winterbottom quickly became the leading stateside authority for a “privity of 
contract” (or simply “privity”) requirement for the recovery in negligence against a 
manufacturer, wholesaler, or retailer for injuries associated with a defective product.  
The plaintiff in Winterbottom was an English postman who worked for a 
contractor who had, in turn, been retained by the Postmaster General to deliver the 
mail.16 The plaintiff’s duties required that he use a coach provided by the defendant, 
who had entered into a contract with the Postmaster General to supply and maintain 
these vehicles.17 Due to “certain latent defects,” the coach broke down while the 
plaintiff was driving it, causing the plaintiff to become lamed for life.18 The plaintiff 
brought suit against the supplier of the coach, alleging negligence.19  
In rejecting the plaintiff’s suit, the Court of Exchequer stressed the absence 
of privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. Per Lord Abinger’s 
opinion,  
if the plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even any person passing 
along the road, who was injured by the upsetting of the coach, might 
bring a similar action. Unless we confine the operation of such 
contracts as this to the parties who entered into them, the most 
absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit, 
would ensue.20  
                                                          
15 Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 10 Meeson & Welsby 109. 
16 Id. at 109–10. 
17 Id. at 109. 
18 Id. at 110. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 114. 
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Winterbottom did not bar any and all recoveries by plaintiffs who lacked 
contractual privity with the manufacturer or other seller of a defective product. 
Significantly, Baron Alderson’s concurring opinion in Winterbottom distinguished the 
recently decided case of Langridge v. Levy.21 The court in Langridge had allowed a 
plaintiff, a minor, to recover for injuries caused by defective gun that had been 
purchased from the defendant by the plaintiff’s father. The seller had represented to 
the father that the gun was safe. Alderson saw the Langridge plaintiff’s claim as 
sounding in fraud.22 Since there were no comparable representations made in 
Winterbottom, the plaintiff could not recover.23 In distinguishing Langridge in this 
manner, Alderson left open a narrow aperture for plaintiffs who could cast their 
products claims in the language of deceit. In the years that followed, however, 
relatively few plaintiffs framed their cases this way, likely because the required 
representations and reliance rarely appeared.24 
2. MacPherson and the Demise of Privity in Negligence Cases 
American audiences appreciated Winterbottom as a leading case in the area of 
products liability,25 but soon carved out a significant exception to its rule. In Thomas 
                                                          
21 Id. at 113–14, 115–16.  
22 Langridge v Levy (1837) 150 Eng. Rep. 863, 2 Meeson & Welsby 519.  
23 Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 Meeson & Welsby at 116.  
24 Note, Sales-Manufacturer and Dealers-Liability of a Supplier of Goods to One Other than His Immediate 
Vendee, 21 MINN. L. REV. 315, 321 (1937) (stating that “as a practical matter, this solution offers little 
protection to the ultimate consumer, because very seldom can he prove the elements necessary to 
maintain this action.”). Framed broadly, the Langridge holding can be understood as the wellspring for 
later decisions that allowed plaintiffs to recover against product manufacturers, notwithstanding a lack 
of privity of contract, by pleading and proving that the manufacturers had communicated express 
warranties to them through advertising or other representations. E.g., Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car 
Co., 288 N.W. 309, 313 (Mich. 1939); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 139 N.E.2d 871, 886 
(Oh. 1957); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 12 P.2d 409, 412 (Wash. 1932). 
25 Most American torts treatises of the late 1800s and early 1900s lined up behind the Winterbottom 
rule. E.g., THOMAS M. COOLEY & JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS: OR THE 
WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENTLY OF CONTRACT § 373 (Student Ed. 1907) (“The general rule 
is that a contractor, manufacturer, vendor or furnisher of an article is not liable to third parties who 
have no contractual relations with him for negligence in the construction, manufacture or sale of such 
article.”); WILLIAM B. HALE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 232a (1896); 2 EDWIN A. 
JAGGARD, HAND-BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 260 (1895); THOMAS G. SHEARMAN & AMASA A. 
REDFIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW ON NEGLIGENCE § 54 (1880); FRANCIS WHARTON, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE §§ 439–40 (1874). That said, a few of the leading treatises of 
that period failed to mention Winterbottom in their discussions of products liability. E.g., FRANCIS M. 
BURDICK, THE LAW OF TORTS: A CONCISE TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LIABILITY AT COMMON LAW 
AND UNDER MODERN STATUTES FOR ACTIONABLE WRONGS TO PERSON AND PROPERTY § 550 (3d 
ed. 1913). One treatise appears to have regarded Winterbottom as stating an exception to the general rule: 
The general result may be stated to be, that if the defendant intended or if he can 
fairly be assumed to have intended the acts of the intermediate agency, as where he 
expects or contemplates them, —for instance by making a railway carriage, to be 
used by passengers of the railway company for which it is made—he will be liable, 
though his act was a breach of contract with another. 
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v. Winchester,26 decided in 1852, a bottle of poison was erroneously given an 
innocuous label by the defendant, sold through a series of intermediaries, and 
ultimately purchased by the husband of the unfortunate consumer.27 In allowing the 
husband and wife’s negligence suit to proceed, the New York Court of Appeals 
genuflected to Winterbottom’s reasoning and result, but found its rule inapposite in 
situations where the product involved was “imminently dangerous to human life.”28  
Other jurisdictions came to recognize a similar exception.29 These decisions 
and other authorities phrased this principle in different ways. One leading treatise 
provided that the privity rule did not bar claims where “the act of negligence is one 
which in its nature endangers human life.”30 The Massachusetts Supreme Court 
bypassed the privity requirement in a case that involved “the furnishing of provisions 
which endanger human life or health.”31 The Minnesota Supreme Court refused to 
bar a plaintiff’s lawsuit when the defendant, a manufacturer of ladders, “had reason 
to apprehend that the use of it by the plaintiff, or by any one, would be attended by 
serious personal injury.”32 And the New York Court of Appeals later applied the 
exception in cases involving a collapsing scaffold33 and an exploding coffee urn34—
potentially dangerous items, to be certain, but not quite as obviously so as mislabeled 
poison. 
These cases set the stage for the 1916 decision by the New York Court of 
Appeals in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company.35 MacPherson involved a 1911 Buick 
automobile that “suddenly collapsed,” injuring the owner.36 Turned plaintiff, the 
owner attributed the accident to a defective wheel supplied by a components 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
MELVILLE MADISON BIGELOW, THE LAW OF TORTS 189–90 (8th ed. 1907) (distinguishing 
Winterbottom with a “but see” signal in an accompanying footnote) (footnotes omitted). 
26 Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852). 
27 Id. at 405–06.  
28 Id. at 408.  
29 E.g., Norton v. Sewall, 106 Mass. 143, 144 (Mass. 1870). Furthermore, some jurisdictions 
recognized exceptions to the general privity rule where “an owner’s act of negligence which causes 
injury to one who is invited by him to use his defective appliance upon the owner’s premises may 
form the basis of an action against the owner,” or (drawing from the Langridge precedent) when “one 
who sells or delivers an article which he knows to be imminently dangerous to life or limb to another 
without notice of its qualities [and] any person . . .  suffers an injury therefrom which might have been 
reasonably anticipated.” Huset v. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 F. 865, 870–71 (8th Cir. 1903). 
30 SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, supra note 25, at § 54.  
31 Bishop v. Weber, 1 N.E. 154, 154 (Mass. 1885). 
32 Schubert v. J.R. Clark Co., 51 N.W. 1103, 1106 (Min. 1892).  
33 Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470, 478 (N.Y. 1882). 
34 Statler v. George A. Ray Mfg. Co., 88 N.E. 1063, 1064–65 (N.Y. 1909). 
35 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). For a detailed evaluation of the 
MacPherson case, see James A. Henderson, Jr., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.: Simplifying the Facts While 
Reshaping the Law, in TORTS STORIES 41 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman, eds., 2003). 
36 MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1051. 
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manufacturer and integrated by Buick into the finished vehicle, allegedly without 
adequate inspection.37 Because the automobile had been purchased from an 
intermediary dealer, as a defendant Buick naturally pointed out the lack of privity of 
contract between it and the plaintiff.38 The Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Justice 
Cardozo, held that the lack of privity did not protect Buick. Drawing upon and 
engrossing Thomas and its progeny, the MacPherson court rejected a privity 
requirement in negligence actions where “the nature of [the product] is such that it is 
reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made.”39  
MacPherson’s diminution of privity requirement dovetailed with ongoing shifts 
in the market for consumer goods. The rise of mass production40 and the 
transportation revolution of the 1800s and early 1900s41 placed physical distance 
between the makers and users of many products, limiting the consumer’s ability to 
interrogate the manufacturer about the qualities of its goods. This distance was 
accompanied by the introduction of wholesaler and retailer intermediaries into the 
supply chain,42 which further alienated consumers from the manufacturers of the 
products they purchased. Also, product branding—a relative novelty as late as the 
1880s43—became a central part of many companies’ marketing strategies, with 
manufacturers turning more and more toward advertising, packaging, and promotion 
to influence how consumers perceived their products.44 Finally, at the point of sale, 
                                                          
37 Id.   
38 Henderson, supra note 35, at 48–49 (discussing Buick’s strategy on appeal). 
39 Id.  
40 See generally DAVID A. HOUNSHELL, FROM THE AMERICAN SYSTEM TO MASS PRODUCTION, 1800–
1932 (1984) (tracking this evolution).  
41 See JOHN STEELE GORDON, AN EMPIRE OF WEALTH: THE EPIC HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
ECONOMIC POWER 148–49 (2004) (discussing how the expansion of railroads contributed toward the 
creation of a national market); RICHARD S. TEDLOW, NEW AND IMPROVED: THE STORY OF MASS 
MARKETING IN AMERICA 12–13 (1996) (discussing improvements in transportation and 
communication and their effects on market development). 
42 Cornelius W. Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 OR. L. REV. 119, 129 (1957) (“In a bygone 
age, when goods were largely made to order by local craftsmen, no legal distinctions between 
manufacturers and retailers were generally necessary to protect the consumer.”); Note, Sales-
Manufacturer and Dealers-Liability of a Supplier of Goods to One Other than His Immediate Vendee, supra note 
24, at 315 n.2; Note, The Marketing Structure and Judicial Protection of the Consumer, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 77, 
78–82 (1937). 
43 SUSAN STRASSER, SATISFACTION GUARANTEED: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN MASS MARKET 
37 (1989). 
44 See CHARLES F. MCGOVERN, SOLD AMERICAN: CONSUMPTION AND CITIZENSHIP, 1890–1945 10 
(2006) (“only between 1880 and 1930 did Americans come to depend on the commercial marketplace, 
with few feasible alternatives, for the necessities of modern life.”); DANIEL POPE, THE MAKING OF 
MODERN ADVERTISING 49–51 (1983); DANIEL STARCH, PRINCIPLES OF ADVERTISING 32–34, 764 
(1923) (discussing the growth in print advertising venues in the years leading up to 1922, and charting 
the nearly 100-fold increase in trademarks registered annually between 1870 and 1921); STRASSER, 
supra note 43, at 52–57; Robert S. Lynd, The People as Consumers, in 2 RECENT SOCIAL TRENDS IN THE 
UNITED STATES: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S RESEARCH COMMISSION ON SOCIAL TRENDS at 857, 
871–77 (1933) (discussing trends in advertising and branding); Note, Advertising and Buyer’s Remedies, 6 
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customers gravitated toward large stores45 and chain retailers46 with showrooms that 
offered an ever-broader array of items47—but were staffed by clerks who often knew 
little about these goods, and were in no position to advise consumers about their 
proper use.48 Combined, these trends threatened to make a lack of privity an 
increasingly common, and increasingly unfair, defense for product manufacturers 
who failed to act with reasonable care.49  
Whether because of these changes50 or simply concurrently with them, 
almost every state adopted the MacPherson rule between 1916 and 1960.51 In most of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
VAND. L. REV. 376, 376 (1953) (discussing the prevalence of consumer advertising). By the early 
1900s, branding and advertising had made a significant impact on consumer preferences. A 1917 
study published in the Journal of Applied Psychology found that almost all consumers could identify at 
least one brand of twenty commonly used household products, and that advertising represented one 
of the principal influences upon purchasing decisions. L.R. Geissler, Association-Reactions Applied to 
Ideas of Commercial Brands of Familiar Articles, 1 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 278 (1917). 
45 See, e.g., JAN WHITAKER, SERVICE AND STYLE: HOW THE AMERICAN DEPARTMENT STORE 
FASHIONED THE MIDDLE CLASS 8–29 (2006) (surveying the history of downtown department stores 
from 1900 to 1960).  
46 See POPE, supra note 44, at 257 (relating that chain stores accounted for 36.6 percent of retail sales in 
1963, as compared to 22 percent in 1929); Lynd, supra note 44, at 870 (“It is only since 1900 that 
chains may be said to have gained real momentum, while only since the World War have they 
emerged into a position of dominance in distribution.”); Richard C. Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store 
Movement, Localist Ideology, and the Remnants of the Progressive Constitution, 1920–1940, 90 IOWA L. REV. 
1011, 1019–20 (2005) (discussing the growth of chain stores in the early 1900s); Friday Afternoon 
Session, May 22, 1964, supra note 3, at 358 (comments of Dean William L. Prosser) (“[T]he little corner 
shop, the little grocery store. Gentlemen, that is no longer the retailer of today to any very great 
extent. The retailer is Safeway Stores, The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, National Stores, a 
large chain.”). 
47 See CHESTER H. LIEBS, MAIN STREET TO MIRACLE MILE: AMERICAN ROADSIDE ARCHITECTURE 
117–35 (1995) (discussing the emergence and eventual dominance of supermarkets in the food-retail 
business); CONSUMERS’ PROTECTION AND INTEREST PROGRAM: MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF 
THE UNITED STATES RELATIVE TO CONSUMERS’ PROTECTION AND INTEREST PROGRAM, H.R. DOC. 
NO. 364, at 2 (1962) (observing that “[t]he typical supermarket before World War II stocked about 
1,500 separate food items – an impressive figure by any standard. But today it carries over 6,000,” and 
“The housewife is called upon to be an amateur electrician, mechanic, chemist, toxicologist, dietician, 
and mathematician—but she is rarely furnished the information she needs to perform these tasks 
proficiently.”). 
48 See STRASSER, supra note 44, at 203–215, 222, 248–51 (discussing this trend).  
49 See, e.g., Lester W. Feezer, Manufacturer’s Liability for Injuries Caused by His Products, 37 MICH. L. REV. 1, 
3 (1938) (discussing the effect of changed circumstances on the equities of products liability); Robert 
W. Miller, Liability of a Manufacturer for Harm Done by a Product, 3 SYR. L. REV. 106, 106 (1951) (“case 
law before the advent of radio, television, assembly line production, modem packing methods, 
mechanical refrigeration, high speed transportation and current legislation may or may not be in point 
in modern litigation.”). 
50 Several judges would reference these developments when contemplating reform in the products-
liability context. E.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 443 (Cal. 1944) 
(Traynor, J., concurring); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 69 A.2d 161, 180–81 (N.J. 1960); 
Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 181 N.E.2d 399, 402 (N.Y. 1962).  
51 David G. Owen, The Evolution of Products Liability Law, 26 REV. LITIG. 955, 965–66 (2007); R.D. 
Hursh, Annotation, Privity of Contract as Essential to Recovery in Negligence Action Against Manufacturer or Seller 
of Product Alleged to Have Caused Injury, 74 A.L.R. 2d 1111, 1128 (1961). While MacPherson involved 
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these jurisdictions, courts continued to require privity of contract between a plaintiff 
and the defendant(s) when these plaintiffs brought negligence claims that involved 
products that were not “reasonably certain to place and limb in peril when 
negligently made.”52 But these same courts softened this requirement through a fairly 
broad construction of the “reasonably certain” standard.53 Beginning in the 1940s, 
some states went further, and rejected the privity requirement in all products cases 
sounding in negligence, regardless of the nature of the product involved.54  
The resulting upswell in cases led to some doctrinal refinement, with clearer 
distinctions being drawn between different types of negligence claims involving 
defective products. In addition to the negligent construction and testing at issue in 
MacPherson, plaintiffs could and did allege negligence in product design,55 negligent 
failures to warn,56 and otherwise inadequate warnings.57 Design and warning claims 
remained relatively uncommon, however, through the 1950s.58  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
liability to an ultimate purchaser, later cases extended its rule to non-purchaser third parties. WILLIAM 
L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 84 (2d ed. 1955). 
52 PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 51, at § 84; Hursh, supra note 51, at 1180–
83 (listing cases). 
53 Id. at 1128 (“The imminently dangerous product exception to the privity requirement is an 
exceedingly broad one, covering a wide range of products.”). 
54 In 1946, Massachusetts became the first state to make this leap. Carter v. Yardley & Co., 64 N.E.2d 
693 (Mass. 1946). A 1961 American Law Reports annotation identified Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Tennessee, and Wisconsin as states where the state courts had generally 
rejected a privity requirement in products cases sounding in negligence. Hursh, supra note 51, at 1192–
1203.  
55 E.g., Kieffer v. Blue Seal Chemical Co., 196 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1952); Statler v. George A. Ray Mfg. 
Co., 88 N.E. 1063 (N.Y. 1909); Torgeson v. Schultz, 84 N.E. 956 (N.Y. 1909); Coakley v. Prentiss-
Wabers Stove Co. 195 N.W. 388, 392 (Wis. 1923). See also R.D. Hursh, Annotation, Liability of 
Manufacturer or Seller for Injury Caused by Household and Domestic Machinery, Appliances, Furnishings, and 
Equipment, 80 A.L.R.2d 598, 611 (1961) (“The manufacturer is under a duty to exercise reasonable 
care in adopting a safe plan or design for his product.”). On this issue, section 398 of the Restatement 
of Torts, published in 1934, provides: 
A manufacturer of a chattel made under a plan or design which makes it dangerous 
for the uses for which it is manufactured is subject to liability to others whom he 
should expect to use the chattel lawfully or to be in the vicinity of its probable use 
for bodily harm caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the adoption of 
a safe plan or design. 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 398 (1934).   
56 See Hardy Cross Dillard & Harris Hart, II, Product Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty to Warn, 41 
VA. L. REV. 145 (1955) (discussing this type of claim). For a discussion of failure-to-warn claims in the 
pre-MacPherson era, see Huset v. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 F. 865, 871–72 (8th Cir. 1903). 
57 E.g., Peaslee-Gaulbert Co. v. McMath’s Administrator, 146 S. W. 770 (Ky. App. 1912); Farley v. 
Edward E. Tower Co., 171 N.E. 639 (Mass. 1930); Hartmon v. Nat’l Heater Co., 60 N.W.2d 804 
(Minn. 1953); Noone v. Fred Perlberg, Inc., 49 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1944), aff’d, 294 N.Y. 680 (1945). See also 
R.D. Hursh, Liability of Manufacturer or Seller for Injury Caused by Household and Domestic Machinery, 
Appliances, Furnishings, and Equipment, supra note 55, at 612 (“A manufacturer, in furnishing instruction 
with respect to the use of his product, must exercise care to assure that the instructions are adequate 
to protect users from harm.”); A.G.S., Duty of Manufacturer or Seller to Warn of Latent Dangers Incident to 
12 
 
3.  Escola, Warranty, and the Rise of Strict Products Liability in Tort 
Even after the MacPherson reform, a sense remained that negligence law could 
not adequately address all of the problems presented by defective products.59 It 
remained difficult for plaintiffs in some of these cases to prove that any particular 
party in the product-supply chain had failed to exercise due care,60 and the devices 
that courts were adopting to avoid these problems struck some observers as 
needlessly circuitous.61 Frustrated by these shortcomings, some critics lobbied for a 
strict-liability approach toward products cases. In the first edition of his Handbook of 
the Law of Torts treatise, published in 1941, William Prosser related the case for the 
imposition of strict liability upon the manufacturers of defective products. Prosser 
noted that “in recent years” there had been: 
an increased feeling that social policy demands that the burden of 
accidental injuries caused by defective chattels be placed upon the 
producer, since he is best able to distribute the risk to the general 
public by means of prices and insurance. Added to this is the 
difficulty of proving negligence with the aid of res ipsa loquitur, 
together with the wastefulness and uncertainty of a series of warranty 
actions carrying liability back through retailer and jobber to the 
original maker, the practice of reputable manufacturers to stand 
behind their goods as good business policy, and a recognition that 
the intermediate seller is usually a mere conduit to market the 
product. There is an obvious argument that in the public interest the 
consumer is entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Article as a Class, as Distinguished from Duty with Respect to Defects in Particular Article, 86 A.L.R. 947 (1933) 
(collecting cases). 
58 See Harold A. Katz, Negligence in Design a Developing Area of Product Liability Law, NACCA ELEVENTH 
ANN. CONVENTION 1957 at 216, 217 (1958) (“Negligence based on ‘failure to exercise reasonable 
care in the adoption of a safe plan or design’ is the field of product liability law to which least 
attention has been directed.”); Harold A. Katz, Liability of Automobile Manufacturers for Unsafe Design of 
Passenger Cars, 69 HARV. L. REV. 863, 871 (1956) (observing that lawyers had not yet devoted 
significant attention to flaws in automobile design). 
59 Feezer, supra note 49, at 3 (“[t]he legal problems arising from the function of manufacturers in the 
modern social organization cannot be handled adequately on the basis of negligence alone. Proof of 
negligence is impossible in many cases where human nature instinctively senses obligation.”). 
60 Gerald A. Gleason, Investigation, Preparation and Defense of Products Liability Cases, 20 INS. COUNSEL J. 
114, 117 (1953) (“Negligence on the part of the manufacturer is often very difficult to prove.”); 
William L. Prosser, Assault on the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L. J. 1099, 1116–17 
(1960). 
61 E.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 442–43 (1944) (Traynor, J., 
concurring); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 83 (1941). 
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some one [sic], and that the producer, practically and morally, is the 
one to provide it.62  
Three years later, California Supreme Court Justice Roger Traynor would 
echo these arguments in his concurring opinion in the Escola case.63 Traynor also 
emphasized that because of mass-marketing trends, “[t]he consumer no longer has 
means or skill enough to investigate for himself the soundness of a product.”64  
In lobbying for strict liability in tort, Prosser noted that extension of the law 
of implied warranty represented “[t]he device most readily at hand to accomplish this 
result.”65 Indeed, breach-of-warranty claims would provide the principal vehicle 
through which plaintiffs pressed products cases through the 1950s.66 A products case 
potentially implicated an express warranty,67 an implied warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose,68 and an implied warranty of merchantability.69 The last of these 
warranties gave rise to the most claims.70  
                                                          
62 PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 61, at § 83. 
63 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d at 440–44 (Traynor, J., concurring). Another 
jurist, Karl Llewellyn, thought along similar lines. A 1941 draft of the Revised Uniform Sales Act 
prepared by Llewellyn contained a section 16-B, titled “Obligation to Consumer and to Dealer for 
Non-Apparent Dangerous Defect,” that would have made manufacturers liable to remote buyers 
injured in person, property, or otherwise as a result of a defect in the manufacturer’s goods. A 
comment to this section provided that the term “defect” was intended to be broad enough to include 
“defects of manufacture or design, adulteration, presence of foreign substances, and indeed the whole 
range of hidden danger, when the net product appears and ought to be safe to use in the ordinary 
manner, but is not.” John W. Wade, Tort Liability for Products Causing Physical Injury and Article 2 of the 
U.C.C., 48 MO. L. REV. 1, 13–16 (1983) (quoting the draft and discussing the circumstances 
surrounding its preparation). When placed up for debate, this section did not meet with a rousing 
reception, and Llewllyn abandoned it. Id. at 16–20.  
64 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d at 443 (Traynor, J., concurring). 
65 PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 61, at § 83. 
66 Gillam, supra note 42, at 124 (“The consumer’s rights against the retailer now are stated principally 
in terms of warranty rather than in terms of negligence.”). 
67 Per the Uniform Sales Act, “Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the 
goods is an express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the 
buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon. No affirmation of 
the value of the goods, nor any statement purporting to be a statement of the seller’s opinion only 
shall be construed as a warranty.” Uniform Sales Act § 12. The Uniform Sales Act was adopted by 34 
states between 1906 and 1947, making it the operative law in a majority of the states. Donald J. 
Smythe, Transaction Costs, Neighborhood Effects, and the Diffusion of the Uniform Sales Act, 1906–1947, 4 
REV. OF LAW & ECON. 341, 341 (2008).   
68 Under the Uniform Sales Act, “Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the 
seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that the buyer relies on 
the seller’s skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied 
warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose.” Uniform Sales Act § 15.  
69 Per the Uniform Sales Act, “Where the goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in 
goods of that description (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied 
warranty that the goods shall be of a merchantable quality.” Uniform Sales Act §15. 
70 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER 
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Recovery under a warranty theory could be simpler or more complicated 
than a lawsuit cast in negligence. Plaintiffs could obtain relief for a breach of the 
implied warranty of merchantability by showing that the goods they purchased from 
the defendant had not been “reasonably fit for the ordinary uses to which goods of 
[their] kind are put,”71 without also having to establish that the defect owed to the 
seller’s negligence. Liability under an implied-warranty theory was therefore “strict” 
in a manner that negligence liability was not. But there were trade-offs. Among them, 
there existed important defenses to a warranty claim that did not exist in the 
negligence context. Warranties could be disclaimed by the seller as part of a contract 
for sale,72 and plaintiffs had to provide the defendant with reasonable notice of any 
breach.73  
Of at least equal importance, under prevailing privity rules, only the person 
who had purchased the goods at issue could claim warranty protections, and only 
against the immediate seller.74 This privity barrier proved more resilient in the 
warranty context than it had been in negligence cases.75 Although it was widely 
understood that the concept of an implied warranty had a historical and logical 
connection to public-policy precepts similar to those associated with tort liability,76 it 
remained that without some contract, there could be no warranty.77 This connection 
led to a conflation of the two concepts, with courts declining to extend warranties to 
remote (downstream) purchasers, or to strangers to a purchasing contract, such as 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
THE UNIFORM SALES ACT §§ 229, 232–34 (1909).  
71 William L. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV. 117, 130 (1943). 
72 Per section 71 of the Uniform Sales Act, “Where any right, duty or liability would arise under a 
contract to sell or a sale of implication of law, it may be negatived or varied by express agreement or 
by the course of dealing between the parties, or by custom, if the custom be such as to bind both 
parties to the contract or the sale.” Uniform Sales Act § 71. See also Fleming James, Jr., Products 
Liability, 34 TEX. L. REV. 192, 210–12 (1955) (discussing the law of disclaimers); Prosser, The Implied 
Warranty of Merchantable Quality, supra note 71, at 157–67 (same). 
73 Under section 49 of the Uniform Sales Act, “if, after acceptance of the goods, the buyer fails to give 
notice to the seller of the breach of any promise or warranty within a reasonable time after the buyer 
knows, or ought to know of such breach, the seller shall not be liable therefor.” Uniform Sales Act 
§ 49. See also James, supra note 72, at 196–98 (discussing the notice requirement); Donald P. Newell, 
Notice Requirement in Warranty Actions Involving Personal Injury, 51 CAL. L. REV. 586 (1963) (same). 
74 WILLISTON, supra note 70, at § 244. 
75 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 28.16 (1956). See also R.D. 
Hursh, Annotation, Privity of Contract as Essential to Recovery in Action Based on Theory Other than Negligence, 
Against Manufacturer or Seller of Product Alleged to Have Caused Injury, 75 A.L.R.2d 39, 44–45 (1961) (“[t]he 
traditional, and still prevailing, view is that privity of contract is indispensable to recovery against the 
manufacturer or seller of a product which has caused injury where the defendant’s breach of an 
express or implied warranty is asserted.”). 
76 See, e.g., PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 61, § 83 (observing that “the 
action for breach of a warranty was originally a tort action”).  
77 Note, Strict Products Liability and the Bystander, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 916, 923 (1964) (“privity—i.e., the 
existence of a direct contractual relationship—was a conceptual necessity because the seller’s modem 
obligations for defective products developed as a part of the law of contracts.”). 
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family members or employees of the consumer.78 Even as they paid lip service to the 
privity rule, however, courts resorted to a number of stratagems to avoid it. The 
various legal fictions they developed toward this purpose,79 which honored the 
privity requirement in theory if not in spirit, got the job done but failed to satisfy 
from a doctrinal perspective.80  
The first batch of outright rejections of a privity requirement for an implied-
warranty claim appeared in cases involving tainted or unwholesome food.81 Starting 
with a Washington Supreme Court decision in 1913,82 many states carved out an 
exception to the prevailing privity rule for warranty claims premised on rotten or 
adulterated food products. This deviation caught on slowly at first. 1941, Prosser 
wrote that the majority of jurisdictions still demanded privity of contract between the 
plaintiff and defendant in these cases.83 Prosser could have added the word “vast” in 
front of “majority,” since only the highest courts of a handful of other states had 
joined Washington as of that time.84 But the tide would soon change. A few states—
Texas,85 Florida,86 Oklahoma,87 Louisiana,88 and Minnesota89 (the latter in express 
                                                          
78 PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 61, at § 83.  
79 One commentator, writing in 1957, identified 29 “fictions, subterfuges, and bold strikes” that courts 
had used to avoid the privity bar in warranty suits. Gillam, supra note 42, at 152–55. 
80 Id. at 155. See also Mark A. Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-
Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974, 991 (1966) (stating that the reasoning employed in cases that 
employed legal fictions to dodge the privity bar “was never very clear.”). That courts were resorting to 
spurious fictions to avoid the privity requirement was far from a secret among judges. See, e.g., Beck v. 
Spindler, 99 N.W.2d 670, 682 (Minn. 1959) (“It would seem that some other courts have tried to find 
a way of permitting recovery without expressly discarding the idea of privity.”). 
81 See Prosser, Assault on the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), supra note 60, at 1103–06. 
82 Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 135 P. 633, 636 (Wash. 1913). Earlier decisions had applied a similar rule, 
but under the authority of state-specific pure food and drug laws. E.g., Meshbesher v. Channellene Oil 
& Mfg. Co., 119 N.W. 428, 429–30 (Minn. 1909). 
83 PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 61, at § 83. Prosser noted, however, that 
“[t]he more recent cases . . . have shown a definite tendency in that direction. It seems probable that 
this will be the law of the future, and that the end of the next quarter of a century will find the 
principle generally accepted.” Id.  
84 Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., Ltd., 93 P.2d 799, 804 (Cal. 1939); Davis v Van Camp Packing Co., 
176 N.W. 382, 390 (Iowa 1920); Swengel v F. & E. Wholesale Grocery Co., 77 P.2d 930, 935 (Kan. 
1938); Coca-Cola Bottling Works v Lyons, 111 So. 305, 307 (Miss. 1927); Kelley v John R. Daily Co., 
181 P. 326, 329 (Mont. 1919); Catani v Swift & Co., 95 A. 931, 932 (Pa. 1915). Also, an appellate 
court in Ohio had upheld the privity requirement, but cast the consumer as a third-party beneficiary 
of the contract for sale between the manufacturer and the retailer. Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 161 
N.E. 557, 559 (Ohio. App. 1928). Arizona appears to have implicitly rejected a privity requirement in 
Eisenbeiss v. Payne, 25 P.2d 162, 166 (Ariz. 1933), but in a 1957 decision that formally interred the 
privity requirement in food cases, the Arizona Supreme Court said that the privity issue “had never 
before been presented to this court for decision.” Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey, 317 P.2d 
1094, 1096 (Ariz. 1957). 
85 Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 164 S.W.2d 828, 834 (Tex. 1942). 
86 Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 19 So.2d 313, 316 (Fla. 1944).  
87 Griffin v Asbury, 165 P.2d 822, 826 (Okla. 1946) 
88 Le Blanc v Louisiana Coca Cola Bottling Co., 60 So.2d 873, 875 (La. 1952). 
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warranty cases only)—foreswore a privity element in food cases during the 1940s 
and the early 1950s. And then, the floodgates opened. Between 1957 and 1961, the 
supreme courts of eight states90 all rejected or significantly pared back the privity rule 
in warranty cases involving food products.91  
The post-World War II era also saw a few courts chip away at the privity 
barrier in warranty cases that involved products other than food. Some of these cases 
waved away a privity requirement where the product at issue was somehow 
analogous to food. For example, the privity requirement was lifted in a few cases 
involving defective animal feed,92 “apparently on the bald theory that food is food.”93 
Some of the few courts to confront the issue also declined to require privity of 
contract in cases involving personal-hygiene products, analogized to food on the 
ground that they were all used directly upon, if not inside, the person.94 The 
Michigan Supreme Court would go a step further in 1958. The plaintiff in Spence v. 
Three Rivers Building and Masonry Supply, Inc.,95 owned a cottage built with cinderblocks 
supplied by the defendant and sold to a contractor hired by the plaintiff. Shortly after 
the cottage was built, the blocks started to crack, chip, and decay.96 The plaintiff sued 
the manufacturer of the blocks on implied- and express-warranty theories.97 The 
court spotted actionable negligence on the facts alleged, but also gainsaid any privity 
requirement for recovery in warranty, as it saw “no reason in logic or sound law why 
recovery in [warranty cases] should be confined to . . . food and related cases and 
denied in all others.”98  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
89 Randall v. Goodrich-Gamble Co., 54 N.W.2d 769, 771 (Minn. 1952). 
90 Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey, 317 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Ariz. 1957); Tiffin v Great Atlantic 
& Pacific Tea Co.162 N.E.2d 406, 411 (Ill. 1959); Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 109 
N.W.2d 918, 921–22 (Mich. 1961); Midwest Game Co. v. M. F. A. Milling Co., 320 S.W.2d 547, 550 
(Mo. 1959); Asher v Coca Cola Bottling Co. 112 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Neb. 1961); Greenberg v. Lorenz, 
173 N.E.2d 773, 775–76 (N.Y. 1961) (rejecting the privity requirement, at least when the plaintiff was 
a member of the purchaser’s household); Schneider v Suhrmann, 327 P.2d 822, 825 (Utah 1958); 
Swift & Co. v. Wells, 110 S.E.2d 203, 208–09 (Va. 1959). 
91 Connecticut, meanwhile, abandoned the privity rule in warranty cases involving prepackaged 
consumer goods. Hamon v. Digliani, 174 A.2d 294, 296 (Conn. 1961). 
92 E.g., Midwest Game Co. v. M.F.A. Milling Co., 320 S.W.2d 547, 550 (Mo. 1959). 
93 Prosser, Assault on the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), supra note 60, at 1111. 
94 See Alexander v. Inland Steel Co., 263 F.2d 314, 318 (8th Cir. 1958) (discussing these cases); 
Graham v. Bottenfield’s, Inc., 269 P.2d 413, 418 (Kan. 1954); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 
139 N.E.2d 871, 886 (Oh. 1957).  
95 90 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1958). 
96 Id. at 874. 
97 Id. at 875. 
98 Id. at 878. 
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Through the 1950s, decisions such as Spence were few and far between.99 
Nevertheless, these rulings cheered a cluster of academics who had spent the past 
several years advocating for strict liability to the consumer. Among them, Yale Law 
School Professor Fleming James advocated for the “enterprise liability” of 
manufacturers in law-review articles and in his influential 1956 treatise, co-authored 
with his colleague, Professor Fowler Harper.100 William Prosser, who had started the 
strict-liability ball rolling almost two decades before, wrote in 1960 that Spence and a 
handful of similar decisions collected from other jurisdictions evidenced a positive 
“Trend” toward strict liability to the consumer.101  
Almost simultaneously with Prosser’s announcement,102 the New Jersey 
Supreme Court handed down Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,103 which rewrote the 
law of warranty in that state. Henningsen involved an new Plymouth automobile, 
bought by a husband for his wife.104 Shortly after the vehicle’s purchase, while Mrs. 
Henningsen was driving it, she heard a cracking noise under the hood.105 Her 
Plymouth veered off the road, injuring Mrs. Henningsen and seriously damaging the 
car.106 She and her husband sued both the dealer from which Mr. Henningsen had 
purchased the car, as well as the automobile’s manufacturer, Chrysler. The trial court 
threw out the plaintiffs’ negligence claim, but allowed their implied-warranty claim to 
go to the jury.107 After deliberations, the jury returned with a $30,000 plaintiffs’ 
verdict—$26,000 to Mrs. Henningsen and $4,000 for her husband.108  On appeal, the 
Henningsen defendants attacked the trial court’s decision to allow the plaintiffs’ 
warranty claims to proceed, since Mrs. Henningsen had not purchased the vehicle 
                                                          
99 See also B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501, 505 (10th Cir. 1959) (rejecting a privity 
requirement for an implied-warranty claim involving an exploding tire). 
100 The most well-known of James’s works on products liability are Fleming James, Jr., Products 
Liability, 34 TEX. L. REV. 44 (1955); James, supra note 72; and the relevant portions of his treatise, 2 
HARPER & JAMES, JR., supra note 75, at §§ 28.1–28.33. A detailed review of James’s scholarship, as it 
pertains to products liability, appears at Priest, supra note 6, at 471–83, 501–03. 
101 Prosser, Assault on the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), supra note 60, at 1114. While Prosser is 
today the most celebrated of these prophets, the general trend toward greater liability on the part of 
manufacturers and sellers was quite obvious to many observers of the time. E.g., Paul Oberst, Torts, in 
1959 ANN. SURVEY OF AM. L. 442, 459 (Albert H. Garretson, ed., 1960) (“As might be expected the 
year saw continued changes in the direction of thrusting the risk of injury by defective products upon 
those most able to absorb and distribute this burden.”). 
102 As sleuthed by Priest, supra note 6, at 506–07. 
103 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). For a thorough retelling and examination of the Henningsen case, drawing 
from original court documents, see Jay N. Feinman & Caitlin Edwards, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 
Inc. (1960): Promoting Product Safety by Protecting Consumers of Defective Goods, in COURTING JUSTICE: TEN 
NEW JERSEY CASES THAT SHOOK THE NATION 5–22 (Paul L. Tractenberg, ed. 2013). 
104 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d at 73. 
105 Id. at 75. 
106 Id. 
107 Id.  
108 Feinman & Edwards, supra note 103, at 8. 
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herself, and neither plaintiff had direct contractual relations with Chrysler.109 The 
New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously rejected these arguments, in a striking 
renunciation of the privity requirement.110 For good measure, Henningsen held that the 
defendants’ written disclaimer of warranties was void as contrary to public policy.111  
The legal community appreciated the path-breaking nature of the Henningsen 
precedent, “the first unequivocal holding by the highest court of a state that privity is 
unnecessary to warranty liability.”112 Other states, most notably New York, soon 
followed Henningsen’s lead in eliminating or paring back privity requirements for 
warranty claims.113 Within three years, however, Henningsen had been trumped by the 
California Supreme Court’s Greenman decision,114 which shifted the focus of 
products-liability reform from warranty to “pure” tort law.  
Greenman, which involved an allegedly defective “ShopSmith” workbench, 
was brought as a negligence and warranty case. The plaintiff received a judgment in 
his favor, which the Court of Appeal affirmed over the manufacturer’s argument that 
the plaintiff had not given timely notice of the defect.115 Upon granting review, the 
California Supreme Court endorsed the Court of Appeal’s reasoning on the warranty 
issue.116 Though this conclusion sufficed to resolve the case, the Court further 
opined that “[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the 
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a 
                                                          
109 Brief for Defendant, Bloomfield Motors, Inc., as Cross-Respondent and Appellant at 23–24, 
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (No. A-50); Brief for Defendant, Chrysler 
Corporation as Cross-Respondent and Appellant at 13–16, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 
A.2d 69 (1960) (No. A-50). 
110 Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 84, 99–100. 
111 Id. at 95, 97. 
112 Recent Case: Sales-Implied Warranties-Implied Warranty of Merchantability Renders Manufacturer Liable to 
Buyer’s Wife Despite Disclaimer Clause and Absence of Privity of Contract – Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. 
(N.J. 1960), 74 HARV. L. REV. 630, 630 (1961). 
113 E.g., Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 353 P.2d 575, 581 (Cal. 1960); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Anderson-Weber, Inc., 110 N.W.2d 449, 455 (Iowa 1961); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 
191 N.E.2d 81, 83 (N.Y. 1963); Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 181 N.E.2d 399, 
404 (N.Y. 1962); Greenberg v. Lorenz, 173 N.E.2d 773, 776 (N.Y. 1962). See also General Motors 
Corp. v. Dodson, 338 S.W.2d 655, 660–61 (Ten. App. 1960) (allowing a lawsuit to proceed against the 
manufacturer of an automobile, even when purchased through a dealer, as “the jury could have found 
that [the manufacturer] was the actual person or entity with whom plaintiffs were dealing, and [the 
dealer] was a conduit or subterfuge by which General Motors tried to exempt itself from liability to 
the consumers who are the plaintiffs.”). Federal courts were even more aggressive in attacking the 
privity requirement during this span. See, e.g., Deveny v. Rheem Manufacturing Co., 319 F.2d 124, 130 
(2d Cir. 1963); Bowles v. Zimmer Manuf. Co., 277 F.2d 868, 875 (7th Cir. 1960); Chapman v. Brown, 
198 F.Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff’d, Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962); McQuaide 
v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 190 F.Supp. 252, 254-55 (D. Conn. 1960). 
114 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). 
115 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 23 Cal.Rptr 282, 286 (Cal. App. 1962), aff’d, 377 P.2d 897 
(Cal. 1963).   
116 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d at 900. 
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defect that causes injury to a human being.”117 The Greenman court only cursorily 
canvassed the policy motivations for its adoption of strict liability, stating that these 
reasons had been “fully articulated” elsewhere.118 The court devoted more effort to 
explaining why tort, rather than warranty, represented the optimal doctrinal solution 
to the problems presented by defective products.119  Notwithstanding the efforts that 
had been made to ground warranty in tort law,120 the Greenman court regarded 
warranty as still too closely tethered to the law of sales to provide an adequate basis 
for an obligation imposed for public-policy reasons.121  
Notwithstanding Greenman, no other state adopted strict products liability 
grounded squarely in tort prior to the promulgation of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts Section 402A.122 As prepared by Prosser, the reporter for the Second 
Restatement, this section went through a series of drafts that endorsed strict liability 
for an ever-expanding universe of products. A 1961 draft would have applied strict 
liability only to sales of food products.123 One year later, Prosser revised the 
provision to extend strict liability to “products for intimate bodily use.”124 Finally, in 
1964 Prosser tendered to the American Law Institute (ALI) a provision that allowed 
the “ultimate user or consumer”125 to proceed in tort, on a strict liability basis, against 
the seller of “any product in defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the 
user.”126 The blackletter of Section 402A was accompanied by comments “a” 
through “q,” which provided an atlas to the frontier opened up by the new rule. 
These comments did not resolve every conceivable products issue that might arise—
far from it—but they did address enough of the high-profile fact patterns of the era 
(involving products such as tobacco (at comment i)127 and vaccines (at comment 
                                                          
117 Id. at 900. 
118 Id. at 901.  
119 Id.  
120 See, e.g., Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 181 N.E.2d 399, 401 n.2 (N.Y. 1962) 
(discussing this connection). 
121 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d at 901 (“rules defining and governing 
warranties that were developed to meet the needs of commercial transactions cannot properly be 
invoked to govern the manufacturer’s liability to those injured by their defective products unless those 
rules also serve the purposes for which such liability is imposed.”). 
Id. Cf. Gillam, supra note 42, at 131 (“The modern law generally regards warranty as contractual in 
nature.”). 
122 Some courts had cited to tentative drafts of Section 402A well before the section’s publication in 
finished form. E.g., Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 26 (5th Cir. 1963); 
Strahlendorf v. Walgreen Co., 114 N.W.2d 823, 830 (Wis. 1962). 
123 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (Tentative Draft No. 6 1961). 
124 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (Tentative Draft No. 7 1962). 
125 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (Tentative Draft No. 10 1964).  
126 Id. 
127 At issue in Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963); Green v. American 
Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962); and Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So.2d 69 (Fla. 
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k))128 to assure would-be adopters that strict products liability, though a step forward, 
did have some boundaries. The ALI approved Prosser’s handiwork in May 1964,129 
and Section 402A was formally published a year later.130 
In the years that followed, courts (and a few legislatures) rushed to adopt a 
tort-based theory of strict products liability.131 By 1976, 42 states and the District of 
Columbia had jumped aboard the bandwagon,132 a progression so rapid that it 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1963).  
128 This provision may have been sparked by then-recent litigation over the defective Cutter polio 
vaccine. Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 6 Cal.Rptr. 320 (Cal. App. 1960). 
129 Friday Afternoon Session, May 22, 1964, supra note 3, at 375. 
130 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
131 Bespeaking judicial enthusiasm for the theory, several courts (such as Greenman) adopted a tort 
basis for strict liability under circumstances where it was either unnecessary to the case or arguably not 
properly presented for the court’s consideration. See Herbert W. Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts 
Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REV. 713, 715–17 (1970) (discussing this 
phenomenon).  
132 In alphabetical order, these jurisdictions (with the accompanying decision or legislative act that 
adopted strict products liability in tort) are Alabama (Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So.2d 134 
(Ala. 1976)); Alaska (Clary v. Fifth Ave. Chrysler Center, Inc., 454 P.2d 244 (Alaska 1969)); Arizona 
(O.S. Stapley Co v. Miller, 447 P.2d 248 (Ariz. 1968)); Arkansas (An Act to Impose Liability for Injury 
and Damages Done in Certain Circumstances by Defective Products; and for Other Purposes, Act 
111, 1973 Ark. Acts. 331); Colorado (Hugel v. General Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1975)); 
Connecticut (Garthwait v. Burgio, 216 A.2d 189 (Dec. 30, 1965)); D.C. (Cottom v. McGuire Funeral 
Service, Inc., 262 A.2d 807 (D.C. 1970); Florida (West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., Inc., 336 So.2d 80 
(Fla. 1976)); Georgia (Liability of Manufacturers and Sellers of Personal Property to Users, No. 1085, 
1968 Ga. Laws 1166); Hawaii (Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 470 P.2d 240 (May 26, 1970)); 
Idaho (Shields v. Morton Chemical Co., 518 P.2d 857 (Id. 1974)); Illinois (Suvada v. White Motor Co., 
210 N.E.2d 182 (Ill.  1965)); Indiana (Ayr-Way Stores, Inc. v. Chitwood, 300 N.E.2d 335 (Ind. 1973)); 
Iowa (Hawkeye Security Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 1970)); Kansas (Brooks 
v. Dietz, 545 P.2d 1104 (Kan. 1976)); Kentucky (Dealers Trans. Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co. 402 
S.W.3d 441 (Ky. 1965)); Louisiana (Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co., 250 So.2d 754 (La. 1971)); 
Maine (An Act Relating to Liability for Physical Harm to Users, Consumers or Bystanders from 
Defective Goods or Products, ch. 466, 1973 Me. Laws 822); Maryland (Phipps v. General Motors 
Corp., 363 A.2d 955 (Md. 1976)); Minnesota (McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 488 (Minn. 
1967)); Mississippi (State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So.2d 113 (Miss. 1966)); Missouri (Keener v. 
Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W. 2d 362 (Mo. 1969)); Montana (Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor 
Sales, Inc. 513 P.2d 268 (Mont. 1973)); Nebraska (Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 191 N.W.2d 601 (Neb. 
1971)); Nevada (Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 470 P.2d 135 (Nev. 1970)); New Hampshire (Buttrick 
v. Arthur Lessard & Sons, Inc., 260 A.2d 111 (N.H. 1969)); New Jersey (Santor v. A&M 
Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 350 (N.J. 1965)); New Mexico (Stang v. Hertz Corp., 497 P.2d 732 (May 
26, 1972)); New York (Codling v. Paglia, 298 N.E.2d 622 (N.Y. 1973)); North Dakota (Johnson v. 
Am. Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1974)); Ohio (Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 218 N.E.2d 
185 (Ohio 1966)); Oklahoma (Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974)); 
Oregon (Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467 (Ore. 1967)); Pennsylvania (Webb v. Zem, 220 A.2d 
853 (Pa.  1966)); Rhode Island (Ritter v. Narrangansett Elec. Co., 283 A.2d 255 ((R.I. 1971)); South 
Carolina (An Act to Provide for the Strict Liability of a Seller of a Defective and Unreasonably 
Dangerous Product Which Causes Physical Harm to a User or Consumer or to His Property, No. 
1184, 1974 S.C. Acts 2782); South Dakota (Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 205 N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1973)); 
Tennessee (Ford Motor Co v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966)); Texas (McKisson v. Sales 
Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967)); Vermont (Zaleskie v. Joyce, 333 A.2d 110 (Vt. 1975)); 
Washington (Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 452 P.2d 729 (Wash. 1969)); and Wisconsin (Dippel v. Sciano, 
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amazed even some judges who joined in the movement.133 Utah and West Virginia 
straggled into the fold in 1979.134 In 1986, Wyoming became the last state to date to 
follow the trend.135 As will be discussed in more detail later, Delaware, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, and Virginia remain holdouts, to a degree. 
These five states continue to couch their (enhanced) consumer protections in the 
language of warranty.136   
As a postscript, once courts adopted strict products liability, it became 
apparent that the concept required further elaboration as applied to different types of 
claims. The 1970s through the early 1980s represented strict products liability’s 
awkward teenage years, in which courts sought to define the parameters of the new 
rule.137 Today, the brand of “strict liability” applicable to a case depends on whether 
the defect involved constitutes a “manufacturing defect,” “design defect,” or 
“warning defect.” Only as to the first of these—defined as a defect whereby a 
product’s design does not conform to a manufacturer’s intentions138—is liability truly 
“strict.” The general principles most jurisdictions now apply to design and warning 
claims echo negligence rules, albeit with a paramount focus upon the qualities of the 
product itself, not necessarily the actions of the human agents who produced it.139 
B. The History of Strict Products Liability: Prevailing Themes 
So goes a reasonably formulaic retelling of how strict products liability came 
into being. Some form of this story represents the archetypal tale of doctrinal 
evolution in tort law, probably because of its affirmational, functionalist, and familiar 
nature. The narrative details a steady progression of the law, in synch with broader 
social trends. Marking this evolution are series of touchstone cases, two of which 
were written by the most prominent state-court judges of their respective eras. 
Academics also made significant contributions to the movement, with the most 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
155 N.W.2d 55 (Wis. 1967)). 
133 See McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 488, 500 (Minn. 1967) (commenting upon the 
“remarkable shift” toward adoption of strict products liability). 
134 Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979); West Virginia Morningstar v. 
Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666 (W.Va. 1979). 
135 Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334 (Wyo.  1986). 
136 Cline v. Prowler Indus. of Maryland, Inc., 418 A.2d 968, 975–76 (Del.1980); Jacobs v. Yamaha 
Motor Corp., U.S.A., 649 N.E.2d 758, 763 n.6 (Mass. 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-1.1 (2011); 
Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neale, Architects, Inc., 374 S.E.2d 55, 57 n.4 (Va. 1988). For a 
discussion of the approaches these states (and the other holdout, Michigan) have taken to products 
liability, see DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 281–85 (2d ed. 2008). 
137 See JANE STAPLETON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 29–34 (2005); Owen, The Evolution of Products Liability 
Law, supra note 51, at 978–79. 
138 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998) (defining a manufacturing defect). 
139 See id. (defining design and warning defects). See also James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Negligence 
Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L. REV. 377, 384 (2002) (“In the areas involving generic product risks, 
common law liability of manufacturers has always been, and will always be, based on fault.”). 
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famous torts professor of all having the greatest impact. This narrative, in short, 
reads like a history of a war fought over ideas, in which the good guys won. 
MacPherson, Henningsen, and Greenman play the same roles in this narrative as the 
battles of Shiloh, Gettysburg, and Atlanta do in histories of the Civil War, with 
Cardozo, Traynor, and Prosser standing in for Grant, Sherman, and Lincoln. With its 
top-down approach and march toward the inevitable, despite some setbacks and 
delays along the way, the conventional history of strict products liability thus 
dovetails nicely with how people have been trained to receive histories generally.  
That said, this story also contains some riddles. Among them, this narrative 
begs the question of why strict products liability, after being under consideration for 
so long, was adopted so quickly during the 1960s and 1970s. There exist two basic 
explanations for this pattern. One account argues that various attributes of 1960s 
and 1970s culture disposed the judges of that era to adopt strict products liability. 
The other assigns primary responsibility to a cadre of academics who, from the 
1940s through the 1960s, provided the intellectual breakthroughs that made strict 
products liability respectable.  
The first of these explanations lays strict products liability at the doorstep of 
the activist frisson of the 1960s and 1970s and its impact upon judges. Reflecting on 
this atmosphere, Gary Schwartz has written:  
[I]n expanding liability [during the 1960s and 1970s] modern judges 
drew upon tort law’s negligence tradition, upon the fairness and 
deterrence rationales embedded in that tradition, and upon the 
modern loss-distribution rationale, which could easily enough be 
linked with that tradition. Furthermore, those judges were 
emboldened both by the problem-solving judicial activism of the 
Warren Court and by the more general reform-minded public-policy 
discourse of the 1960s and 1970s. In this latter respect modern tort 
law can be regarded as one of those ambitious programs initiated 
during the Great Society and then confirmed and further 
institutionalized during the 1970s.140 
 As directed toward products liability, the prevailing sense was 
that major American corporations—and in particular, the Big Three 
automakers—were economic colossi that could easily bear whatever 
burdens might be imposed on them by way of regulation and liability. 
A second feature of public opinion was that these corporations 
should not be held in high respect; indeed, they should be frequently 
                                                          
140 Schwartz, supra note 7, at 619. See also Mark Geistfeld, Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.: Strict Products 
Liability Unbound, in TORTS STORIES, supra note 35, 229, 241–42 (discussing this view). 
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distrusted. . . . During the 1960s, the consumer movement was 
gaining force; this movement portrayed innocent consumers as 
needing strong protection from manufacturers, which frequently treat 
consumers in shabby ways. . . . The willingness of courts in the late 
1960s to impose strong liabilities on major corporations (especially 
product manufacturers) was certainly facilitated by this discrediting of 
corporations that was occurring in the public outlook.141 
An alternative explanation for the adoption of strict products liability 
identifies legal academics as a singularly determinative influence. George Priest’s 
article The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of 
Modern Tort Law represents the leading work in this genre. Priest discounts the 
significance of “contemporary social currents” in the adoption of strict products 
liability,142 and instead stresses the efforts made by Professors James and Prosser to 
lay a doctrinal foundation for strict liability in tort.  
As Priest explains (and as summarized earlier, in retelling the conventional 
account of strict products liability’s ascendance), throughout the 1940s and 1950s 
James devised the basic theoretical framework for “enterprise liability,” a theory of 
policy and responsibility that would undergird strict liability to the consumer.143 
Prosser later advocated on behalf of strict liability in his scholarship, most famously 
in his Assault on the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer) article in the Yale Law Journal, 
and steered the American Law Institute toward a full embrace of strict products 
liability through the drafts of Section 402A that he prepared.144 Per Priest’s 
explanation, James brought passion and persistence to the debate over products 
liability, while Prosser contributed catchy prose, a willingness to exaggerate,145 good 
timing,146 and an unparalleled bully pulpit. Their combined efforts did the job. In 
Priest’s version of the story, once enterprise liability gained a consensus among 
academics, “[j]udicial implementation followed almost immediately.”147 
Priest makes three specific assertions as to why academic efforts primed the 
nation’s judges to adopt strict liability with “extraordinary” speed.148 First, he argues 
                                                          
141 Schwartz, supra note 7, at 615. 
142 Priest, supra note 6, at 464. 
143 For an overview of enterprise liability as a positive theory of tort law, see John C.P. Goldberg, 
Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 537–44 (2003). 
144 Priest, supra note 6, at 512–14. 
145 Id. at 514. 
146 As Priest observes, id. at 506, Prosser’s Assault on the Citadel article arrived in libraries and judicial 
chambers only a few months after the New Jersey Supreme Court issued its path-breaking decision in 
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). 
147 Priest, supra note 6, at 464. 
148 Id. at 518. 
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that “the entire world of legal academics and thirty years of accumulated writing 
supported the change.”149 Second, he infers that the thrust of this scholarship 
resonated with the personal experiences of judges.150 Third, according to Priest, strict 
products liability, as framed by James and Prosser, spread apace because of “its 
exceptional sophistication in comparison with extant theories of negligence and 
warranty law and the link that it provide[d] to a broader understanding of the judicial 
purpose.”151 Unlike the stodgy principles of negligence and warranty law, 
“[e]nterprise liability theory . . . appointed the judge an agent of the modern state.”152 
The doctrinal shift “allowed judges to aid the poor” and “adjust production decisions 
in the economy” such that they, too, could participate in the hydraulic adjustments 
of modern governance.153 
The problem with these explanations is not that either is wrong, but that they 
do not tell the entire story. For one thing, neither account, nor the standard history 
with which they work, considers the possible influence of plaintiffs and their counsel 
in the drive toward strict products liability. True, it is impossible to isolate every 
trend or event that conceivably might have contributed toward this shift.154 But 
among these alternative or additional contributions, the absence of plaintiffs and 
their lawyers from the prevailing narratives seems most striking. After all, these 
individuals represented the ground troops in the revolution. Had plaintiffs not come 
to appreciate products-related injuries as tortious, or had lawyers not been willing to 
take their cases, courts would have lacked the raw material with which to innovate. It 
is easy to take these lawsuits as a given, at least if one assumes a receptive judiciary. 
But this assumption is not necessarily accurate. There exist plenty of potentially 
                                                          
149 Id.  
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 518–19. 
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154 For an example of an arguably important indirect influence, between 1957 and 1980, the number 
of states claiming intermediate appellate courts tripled, rising from 11 to 33. Daryl R. Fair, State 
Intermediate Appellate Courts: An Introduction, 24 W. POL. Q.  415, 415 (1971); Carl Norberg, Some Second 
and Third Thoughts on an Intermediate Court of Appeals, 7 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 93, 94 n.1 (1981). The 
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review, as opposed to mandatory jurisdiction over their torts caseload. This transition may have made 
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Robert A. Kagan et al., The Evolution of State Supreme Courts, 76 MICH. L.  REV. 961, 983 (1978) (“[The] 
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passive, reactive bodies . . . but that these courts should be policy-makers and, at least in some cases, 
legal innovators.”). 
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viable claims that never gain broad acceptance, either because plaintiffs do not 
recognize them, or lawyers do not consider them worth their while.155   
Likewise, neither explanation spends much time considering prosaic, nuts-
and-bolts reasons why judges may have adopted strict products liability. Writing in 
1960, Prosser could identify only a few substantial problems with the application of 
negligence law in products cases. “Where the action is against the manufacturer of 
the product,” Prosser acknowledged, “an honest estimate might very well be that 
there is not one case in a hundred in which strict liability would result in recovery 
where negligence does not.”156 To Prosser, negligence “[broke] down” only when the 
negligent manufacturer was insolvent, unknown, or unavailable for process, and a 
plaintiff’s suit against a middleman retailer or wholesaler would fail either because 
these entities had no duty to inspect the defective goods, or because a reasonable 
inspection would not have revealed the defect.157 In the abstract, these concerns 
seem like a thin premise for such an important change in the law, particularly when 
modestly broadened warranty protections against the retailer might have provided an 
adequate remedy. But perhaps there existed prominent case tropes of Prosser’s era 
that highlighted the problems he spotted, and possibly other difficulties with the 
application of standard negligence and warranty principles. If so, the clarity with 
which these cases framed the case for strict products liability may have intrigued 
even hard-headed judges who were generally skeptical about change.   
Finally, neither narrative accounts for the continued existence of the five 
holdouts against framing strict products liability in the tort verbiage that Prosser and 
Traynor prescribed. Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, and 
Virginia also experienced “the more general reform-minded public-policy discourse 
of the 1960s and 1970s.”158 And there exists little indication that these states denied 
their judges access to Prosser’s articles, much less the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 
Yet these states resisted the trend toward strict liability in tort, and opted to work 
within the law of warranty instead. Perhaps strict products liability in tort was less 
overdetermined than conventional wisdom would suggest.  
                                                          
155 See Marc Galanter, Case Congregations and Their Careers, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 371, 377–78 (1990) 
(discussing how claim consciousness (or a lack thereof) among plaintiffs, as well as the interests and 
abilities of plaintiffs’ counsel, affect the volume of litigation involving a particular cause of action); 
Kyle Graham, Of Frightened Horses and Autonomous Vehicles: Tort Law and Its Assimilation of Innovations, 52 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1241, 1257–60  (2012) (discussing claim consciousness among plaintiffs). For a 
critical take on how the profit motives of attorneys can affect the substance of tort law, see LESTER 
BRICKMAN, LAWYER BARONS: WHAT CONTINGENCY FEES REALLY COST AMERICA (2011). 
156 Prosser, Assault on the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), supra note 60, at 1114.  
157 Id. at 1117. 
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 Schwartz, supra note 7, at 619. 
26 
 
III. THE POPULIST NARRATIVE: THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS 
 AND THEIR COUNSEL 
 
Thus, notwithstanding how much has been written about strict products 
liability, there remain several tales to be told. The first of the hidden histories 
concerns how heightened claim consciousness among would-be plaintiffs and an 
increasingly well-organized plaintiffs’ bar affected the development and diffusion of 
this doctrine. Existing narratives concentrate upon the supply of this doctrinal 
innovation by academics and judges. A different perspective would consider the 
forces that drove the demand for change among individual claimants and their 
lawyers. 
 
A. The Emergence of Claim and Class Consciousness 
The sociolegal explanation for strict products liability acknowledges that 
popular hostility toward corporations somehow “facilitated” judicial recognition of 
this doctrine.159 The discussion below ascribes more agency to the burgeoning 
contingent of self-identifying consumers, who as the twentieth century progressed 
came to appreciate an ever-greater array of product-related claims.   
Consumer movements of various types have appeared throughout American 
history. The American Revolution was, in a sense, the most important such 
crusade.160 A century later, the pure food and drug campaign drew strength from a 
broad base of support among consumers, sickened by accounts of unsanitary 
conditions in slaughterhouses and other food processing and distribution facilities.161 
The consumer movement that contributed to the strict products-liability revolution 
evolved more gradually than had these earlier drives. This awakening originated with 
the same trends that caused jurists to reconsider the privity rule in negligence suits: 
mass production, the introduction of middlemen and retailers into the supply chain, 
enhanced advertising and promotion, and expanded retail showplaces.  
                                                          
159 Schwartz, supra note 7, at 619. 
160 See T.H. BREEN, THE MARKETPLACE OF REVOLUTION: HOW CONSUMER POLITICS SHAPED 
AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (2004) (discussing the politicization of consumers in the years leading up 
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In response to these changes, consumers sought out new sources of 
information regarding the quality and safety of products placed on the market.162 
One such resource was Good Housekeeping magazine’s “Seal of Approval” for 
products, inaugurated in the early 1900s.163 Shoppers also began to receive assistance 
from new organizations founded with the mission of promoting consumer 
awareness. The most important of these groups appeared after the 1927 publication 
of the best-selling exposé Your Money’s Worth: A Study in the Waste of the Consumer’s 
Dollar.164 The success of this book led to the formation of Consumers’ Research, 
Incorporated, a consumer advocacy group.165 Beginning in 1931, this organization’s 
biweekly bulletins detailed the hidden dangers of products such as toasters, vacuum 
cleaners, automobiles, and cosmetics.166 Two Consumers’ Research employees soon 
published another best-seller, 100,000,000 Guinea Pigs: Dangers in Food, Drugs, and 
Cosmetics, which condemned the lack of safety testing before the titular products were 
released onto the market.167 In 1936, disgruntled employees of Consumers’ Research 
broke away and formed a rival organization, Consumers Union.168 This organization 
launched its own magazine, Consumer Reports, which also sought to help consumers by 
testing products for safety and utility, and offering recommendations as to their 
acceptability.169 This publication expanded its circulation markedly in the years 
immediately after World War II, and boasted several hundred thousand subscribers 
by the early 1950s.170  
In the post-World War II era, Consumer Reports and similarly minded 
publications had plenty of products to criticize. Cigarettes and a variety of other 
consumer products came under attack during this period as poorly designed or 
otherwise unsafe. In 1952, Reader’s Digest—long “the only mainstream periodical of 
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the time to crusade against the alleged perils of tobacco”171—ran a short story titled 
“Cancer by the Carton” that linked lung cancer to smoking.172 Several other 
mainstream publications, including Time and Life, picked up the story.173 When 
cigarette manufacturers unveiled “safer” filter-tip cigarettes in response to this 
negative publicity, reports circulated that these cigarettes had tar and nicotine levels 
similar to those found in “regular” cigarettes. Congress responded by investigating 
whether cigarette companies engaged in false or misleading advertising in promoting 
their new products.174  
While this hearing failed to produce legislation, other unsafe products did 
generate legislative responses. After flammable cowboy outfits killed or seriously 
injured many children in the late 1940s and 1950s,175 leading to numerous lawsuits,176 
Congress enacted the Flammable Fabrics Act of 1953.177 This law offered weak 
protections, but it at least indicated a degree of interest in the subject of consumer 
protection. Not long thereafter, the deaths of more than 75 children trapped in 
refrigerators over a five-year span178 brought about the Refrigerator Safety Act of 
1956.179  
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Automobile design choices also came under closer scrutiny during the 
postwar period. Up until around 1950, people who decried the mounting number of 
automobile-related deaths focused mostly upon unsafe driving, not defects in the 
vehicles involved.180 Consumer magazines had printed stories during the 1930s about 
how automobiles had been designed for “planned obsolescence,” but these articles 
failed to spark broader interest in the subject.181 Around midcentury, Cornell 
University’s Aeronautical Laboratory began to conduct safety tests on automobiles.182 
These studies led to the formation of the Automotive Crash Injury Research Center 
in 1952.183 The Center used the information it gathered from tests to develop specific 
recommendations about how to improve the design of automobiles for enhanced 
safety.184 One such recommendation involved the installation of seat belts, which 
became an option available on Ford and Chrysler vehicles beginning with the 1956 
model year.185 Though few other immediate safety improvements resulted, the 
information produced by Cornell fed an emerging dialogue about automobile design 
and safety in the halls of Congress186 and elsewhere187 that continued throughout the 
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hoped that these safety features are only the beginning of a new era in basic 
automobile design. Fundamental standard equipment should be designed in full 
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1950s and would yield significant results in the 1960s.188  
During this same postwar period, disturbing revelations emerged about drugs 
and vaccines only recently hailed as panaceas. In the early 1950s the antibiotic 
chloromycetin—praised as a new “wonder drug” on the front page of the New York 
Times just a few years before189—was tied to a spate of serious, occasionally fatal 
blood disorders.190 Meanwhile, a defective batch of polio vaccine manufactured by 
Cutter Laboratories in 1955 infected many children with the disease the vaccine was 
intended to prevent.191 This tragedy led to a civil action and a plaintiffs’ verdict on a 
breach of warranty claim against Cutter (notwithstanding a lack of privity), which 
was affirmed by a California Court of Appeal in 1960.192 And perhaps most 
strikingly, in 1961 it became apparent that the anti-morning sickness drug 
thalidomide had resulted in serious birth defects, such as deformed limbs, in some of 
the children borne by women who used it.193 Thalidomide never had been licensed 
for use in the United States, a close call that owed to the skepticism of a single Food 
and Drug Administration reviewer.194 Nevertheless, some samples had been 
distributed to doctors, leading to an unknown number of “thalidomide babies” being 
born in this country.195    
By the early 1960s, these seriatim revelations had started to instill in many 
consumers a healthy skepticism regarding the safety of the products they used196 and 
an enhanced appreciation of the available legal remedies when seemingly safe 
products proved to be anything but. The existence of unsafe products was nothing 
new; but expectations had changed. Earlier products cases such as Winterbottom and 
MacPherson establish that at least some consumers had long appreciated a possible 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
recognition of the fact that every car may be involved, quite innocently, in a serious 
crash or roll over.  
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tort claim when a product unaccountably failed on them. The prevalence of cases 
involving adulterated food products from the early 1900s onward signified the more 
widespread recognition of a particularly pungent and obvious class of claims. As a 
further step in this progression, during the 1950s and 1960s consumers gravitated 
toward a view that manufacturers of a broad range of products owed them a 
responsibility to make safer products, that many products could be made safer, and 
that some unsafe products were—in the words of Consumer Reports’ test results—not 
just to be avoided, but categorically “not acceptable.”197  
This enhanced claim consciousness, and its connection to both the trends of 
the time and the high-profile cases of the era, were captured by United States 
Supreme Court Associate Justice Robert Jackson in his dissent in Dalehite v. United 
States, a Federal Tort Claims Act case decided by the Court in 1953: 
This is a day of synthetic living, when to an ever-increasing extent 
our population is dependent upon mass producers for its food and 
drink, its cures and complexions, its apparel and gadgets. These no 
longer are natural or simple products but complex ones whose 
composition and qualities are often secret. Such a dependent society 
must exact greater care than in more simple days and must require 
from manufacturers or producers increased integrity and caution as 
the only protection of its safety and well-being. Purchasers cannot try 
out drugs to determine whether they kill or cure. Consumers cannot 
test the youngster’s cowboy suit or the wife’s sweater to see if they 
are apt to burst into fatal flames. Carriers, by land or by sea, cannot 
experiment with the combustibility of goods in transit. Where 
experiment or research is necessary to determine the presence or the 
degree of danger, the product must not be tried out on the public, 
nor must the public be expected to possess the facilities or the 
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technical knowledge to learn for itself of inherent but latent dangers. 
The claim that a hazard was not foreseen is not available to one who 
did not use foresight appropriate to his enterprise.198 
By the time President Kennedy proposed a bundle of modest consumer-
protection measures to Congress in 1962,199 ushering in a decade of legislative 
innovation in this sphere,200 American consumers already had learned to name their 
products-related injuries, and were prepared to blame these injuries on 
manufacturers and others within the supply chain.201 As these consumers came to 
appreciate the possibility of legal redress for a growing array of products-related 
injuries, they could consult an increasingly sophisticated and well-organized pool of 
plaintiff’s attorneys, who had reasons of their own for pursuing products claims.  
B. The Rise of Sophisticated Plaintiffs’ Counsel 
 
Personal-injury lawyers, like attorneys generally, gravitated toward 
professional associations in the post-World War II era.202  In 1946, 11 plaintiffs’ 
workers’ compensation attorneys formed the National Association of Claimants’ 
Compensation Attorneys, or NACCA.203  This organization soon expanded to serve 
the entire plaintiffs’ personal-injury bar.204 By 1956 the NACCA claimed 8,300 
members across 44 state branches and affiliates, and its flagship publication, the 
NACCA Law Journal, had a circulation of around 10,000.205   
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The law journal represented part of the NACCA’s larger educational mission. 
It and another publication produced by the organization, the NACCA News Letter, 
informed readers of recent appellate opinions and lucrative jury verdicts, and offered 
tips on pleading, discovery, and trial techniques.206 To similar effect were educational 
tours of the nation by some of the leaders of the organization, most notably Melvin 
Belli.207 The San Francisco attorney and author of the multi-volume series Modern 
Trials estimated in 1954 that over the preceding four years, he had addressed 
audiences in all but three states.208 Also, each year the NACCA held an annual 
convention and pre-convention that functioned as a networking session, teaching 
seminar, and call to arms.209 Nearly verbatim transcripts of these proceedings were 
stitched together into book form and made available for purchase.210 
The NACCA connected its policy goals with its members’ cases and their 
self-interest. One priority involved products-liability reform, and in particular, 
elimination of the privity bar.211 The NACCA fostered in its members a sense that by 
taking products-liability cases and arguing for doctrinal change, they could do good 
while doing well. Arnold Elkind, a prominent NACCA member who would later 
helm the National Commission on Product Safety,212 summarized both the altruistic 
and the selfish reasons for bringing products cases in a speech to the American Bar 
Association’s Section on Insurance, Negligence and Compensation Law in 1957.213 
Elkind told his audience that “there is a public service element involved. There is the 
satisfaction that by your lawsuit you are protecting consumer [sic], and frequently 
such a result obtains even though the lawsuit is unsuccessful.”214 Also, and probably 
of at least equal significance: 
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On the practical side, we have found that the recoveries in such 
lawsuits represent satisfactory compensation for damage sustained 
more frequently than in the average case. We believe that this is so 
because first there is usually absolutely no question of contributory 
negligence; secondly, there is a dramatic contrast between the 
innocent plaintiff and the “profit-hungry” manufacturer. If pressed, I 
would have to admit that in the capably tried products liability case 
there is probably an element of penal damages which enters into the 
deliberations of the jury in fixing compensation.215 
Other NACCA presentations also stressed the lucrative possibilities 
presented by products cases. Attendees at the 1958 NACCA annual convention, for 
example, were advised of a recent Missouri decision in a products-liability matter, “a 
wonderful case” that, the speaker advised, was “interesting on the damages point, 
too, because they gave an award of $85,000 to a woman claimant. And the court 
entered a remittitur and sliced her down to $65,000. But we have been advised that, 
even as reduced to $65,000, it is the largest award sustained for a woman claimant in 
Missouri.”216 Three conventions later, a speaker reminded attendees that “products 
liability cases today, properly prepared, are bringing among the highest of damage 
awards.”217 Data bore out this assertion; just as the California Supreme Court was 
handing down its Greenman decision, a report on jury verdicts calculated an average 
verdict of $25,879 in products-liability cases in which the plaintiffs had prevailed, as 
compared to an average plaintiff’s verdict of $11,473 in personal-injury cases 
generally.218  
The NACCA’s publications, training curriculum, networking opportunities, 
and other offerings also helped its members overcome the practical issues associated 
with recognizing and trying products cases. In the 1950s and early 1960s, appellate 
decisions that chipped away at privity requirements in warranty cases received close 
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attention in the NACCA Law Journal.219 Annual meetings commonly featured 
sessions in which attorneys shared tips on handling products-liability matters.220 
Leading cases were promoted at these meetings as “wedges” for further doctrinal 
change in the products field.221 Other speakers encouraged attorneys to pursue novel 
products-liability claims.222 One speech given at the NACCA’s annual convention in 
1954, “The Liability in Tort or Warranty of Automobile Manufacturers for the 
Inherently Dangerous Design of Passenger Automobiles,” urged attendees to 
incorporate design-defect allegations into their automobile-accident cases. “As 
lawyers, our inquiry in automobile accident cases has been directed toward 
determining the cause of the accident,” the speaker advised, “to the exclusion of the 
equally pertinent question as to whether the injuries may have resulted from the 
design of the vehicle in which our client was riding in addition to the fact of the 
collision.”223 A few years later, the organization initiated a products-liability 
“exchange” whereby members could share pleadings, briefs, and information 
regarding experts and individual products.224 In launching the exchange, the 
NACCA’s president advised the organization’s members that “no one need ever 
again feel alone in his professional tasks in the tort field.”225 
This increasingly well-organized plaintiff’s bar helped catalyze and capitalize 
upon the caselaw breakthroughs of the early 1960s. Attorneys increasingly framed 
their products cases with an eye toward prompting doctrinal change. Bernard 
Chazen, an NACCA member who argued the Henningsen appeal for the plaintiffs, 
incorporated within the plaintiffs’ opening appellate brief excerpts from both the 
Prosser and the Harper and James treatises in which the authors criticized a rigid 
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L.J. 47, 84–91 (1960) (discussing B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959)); id. 
at 94–95 (discussing Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 343 P.2d 261 (Cal. 1960)). 
220 E.g., Products Liability, in NACCA TWELFTH ANN. CONVENTION 1958 290, 305 (1958) (comments 
of Melvin Belli) (encouraging plaintiffs’ attorneys to plead several causes of action in products-liability 
cases, as they were “on the frontier of something new”). See also TRIAL AND TORT TRENDS: 1957 
BELLI  SEMINAR 86–89 (Melvin M. Belli, ed., 1958) (relating a free-ranging discussion about products 
liability among several NACCA attorneys); TRIAL AND TORT TRENDS: 1958 BELLI  SEMINAR 50–55 
(Melvin M. Belli, ed., 1959) (discussing warranty cases). 
221 Products Liability, supra note 220, at 308 (comments of Melvin Belli). 
222 Cf. National Commission on Product Safety: Hearings Before the Consumer Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Commerce United States Senate, supra note 197, at 41 (statement of Arnold B. Elkind) (“Since 1954 I have 
spoken at innumerable Bar Association meetings, Law School sponsored seminars, and seminars 
conducted under the auspices of the Practicing Law Institute, in an effort to encourage lawyers to 
represent injured consumers in actions against manufacturers of defective products.”). 
223 Harold A. Katz, The Liability in Tort or Warranty of Automobile Manufacturers for the Inherently Dangerous 
Design of Passenger Automobiles, in TRIAL AND TORT TRENDS 903, 903 (Melvin M. Belli, ed., 1956). 
224 Paul D. Rheingold, NACCA Products Liability Exchange, in NACCA SIXTEENTH ANN. 
CONVENTION 1962 359, 359–64 (1963). Alfred S. Julien, President’s Column, NACCA NEWS LETTER, 
Sept. 1958, at 1, 2 (discussing the creation of the products-liability exchange). 
225 Julien, President’s Column, supra note 224, at 2.  
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privity requirement in warranty cases.226 When the New Jersey Supreme Court sided 
with the Henningsen plaintiffs, the NACCA’s publications arm immediately broadcast 
the decision to its members. The July 1960 NACCA News Letter announced that, 
“The New Jersey Supreme Court, on May 9, 1960, in a masterly opinion by Justice 
Francis, handed down a decision which is not only a milestone, landmark and 
turning point in the history of products liability but also one of the finest 
accomplishments of the judicial process in our generation.”227 The NACCA Law 
Journal similarly described Henningsen as “a milestone, turning point and breakthrough 
in the law of products liability.”228 Later that year, Chazen and another attorney who 
also worked on the Henningsen appeal told attendees at the NACCA’s annual 
convention that the opinion was “[l]ike a new star in the skies.”229  
Armed with Henningsen, plaintiffs’ attorneys filed an unprecedented number 
of products-liability actions across the nation.230 As early as 1961, a former NACCA 
president said that the field was “widening so rapidly that it is difficult to keep up 
with the march of citations.”231 By 1963, a defense attorney would describe products 
liability as “the fastest growing, the most controversial and probably the most 
important field in tort law and casualty insurance today.”232 On this point, the 
attorney related the findings of a recent study that had detected an uptick in 
products-liability lawsuits.233 The authors of the report attributed this spike to “(1) 
relaxation of the privity requirement in many jurisdictions, and (2) increased 
awareness and use of the breach of warranty cause of action.”234  
Plaintiffs’ lawyers redoubled their efforts after the Greenman decision and the 
promulgation of Section 402A, as the products-liability terrain shifted away from 
warranty and toward tort law.235 The overlapping nature of warranty and tort in the 
products-liability context encouraged these attorneys to dangle Section 402A bait in 
front of courts that already had bit on warranty. After all, it cost very little to allege 
                                                          
226 Brief for Plaintiffs as Cross-Appellants, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., Superior Court of 
New Jersey Appellate Division, Docket No. A-185-58, at 18–21. 
227 From the Editor’s Scratch Pad, NACCA NEWS LETTER, July 1960, at 3, 3. 
228 Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., Comments on Recent Important Personal Injury (Tort) Cases, 25 NACCA L.J. 47, 
96 (1960). 
229 Nathan Baker & Bernard Chazen, The Henningsen Case: A Landmark in Products Liability, in NACCA 
FOURTEENTH ANN. CONVENTION 1960 588 (1961). 
230 Jack L. Kroner, et al., Torts, in 1966 ANN. SURV. AM. LAW 209, 224 (1967) (“in the mere six years 
following Henningsen, over 200 decisions in more than thirty states have adopted strict liability.”). 
231 Alfred S. Julien, Trial Techniques, in NACCA FIFTEENTH ANN. CONVENTION 1961 403, 403 (1962). 
232 Sedgwick, supra note 218, at 616. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
235 JACOBSON & WHITE, supra note 203, at 98–99 (discussing the ubiquity of NACCA members in 
lobbying courts to adopt strict products liability). 
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an additional theory of recovery in these cases. As early as 1958, Melvin Belli had 
advised his colleagues at the NACCA annual convention to allege as many as six or 
seven causes of action in a products case: a specific act of negligence; res ipsa loquitur, 
express and implied warranty, “absolute liability,” a violation of a statute, and a 
failure to warn claim.236 The availability of multiple possible defendants in many 
products cases also encouraged innovation. Even where courts had not adopted 
broadened warranty protections, if the plaintiff had purchased the offending item, 
the retailer at a minimum represented a viable defendant under existing law. With at 
least some recovery likely, it cost the plaintiff relatively little to add the manufacturer 
or wholesaler as a defendant, and to tack on a strict-liability claim as to all of the 
allegedly responsible parties.  
The discussion above provides a different way of understanding the switch to 
strict products liability. Academics conceived of products liability and defined its 
contours; judges adopted it. The existing narrative ends there. But the contributions 
of plaintiffs and their attorneys also must be acknowledged, since they provided the 
lifeblood for this transformation in the law. Without their cases, academics and 
judges would have little motivation to innovate, and no material with which to work. 
And while it is easy to assume that plaintiffs and their attorneys will rally around 
every liability-enhancing reform—an “if you build it, they will come” approach to 
doctrinal change—this is not in fact the case.  Plaintiffs do not appreciate each and 
every cause of action that may arise,237 and may abandon even well-recognized 
torts.238 Likewise, attorneys may turn their backs or decline to cultivate causes of 
action that do not appear to be especially lucrative.239 In this respect, the proliferation 
                                                          
236 Products Liability, supra note 220, at 305 (comments of Melvin Belli). See also TRIAL AND TORT 
TRENDS: 1958 BELLI SEMINAR, supra note 220, at 50–51 (also relating this presentation). Tellingly, 
Belli did not include a design-defect claim within this mix, underscoring its marginal status as of that 
time. Cf. Kenneth Parker, et al., Torts, in 1967 ANN. SURVEY OF AM. L. at 191, 217 (1968) (observing 
that design-defect cases are “still predicated upon the theory of negligence” and that there was a “low 
rate of recovery in this area of products liability law.”); Kroner, et al., supra note 230, at 210 (“As a 
practical matter, it is probably a good deal more difficult to convince a judge to decide a design issue, 
as distinguished from a construction issue, and to get a jury to decide a design issue against a 
defendant, because of the relatively esoteric nature of the question.”). 
237 See DEBORAH R. HENSLER, ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED 
STATES 122–23 (1991) (finding a marked difference in claiming tendencies between persons injured in 
automobile accidents on the one hand, and persons injured in different circumstances on the other); 
Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1099–1103 (1996); 
Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System – And Why 
Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1183–86 (1992) (reviewing several studies regarding injury awareness 
and claiming patterns among prospective and actual plaintiffs). 
238 See generally Kyle Graham, Why Torts Die, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 359 (2008) (discussing the 
disappearance of various tort theories due to abolition, abandonment, or other reasons). 
239 See BRICKMAN, supra note 155; Joanna Shepherd, Uncovering the Silent Victims of the American Medical 
Liability System, 67 VAND. L. REV. 151, 154 (2014) (discussing the damages threshold under which 
plaintiffs’ attorneys, per their survey responses, will not accept a medical-malpractice case). 
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of strict products liability may owe as much to its literal value, from the perspective 
of attorneys, as to its expressive value, in the minds of judges.  
At the same time, not all mid-century products lawsuits placed equal pressure 
on existing doctrine. Some types of cases made the argument for a strict-liability 
approach better than others did. The next section of this article discusses another 
way to view the products-liability revolution, as a practical response to the challenges 
presented by particular case tropes that appeared often at midcentury, if not today.   
IV. THE PRACTICAL NARRATIVE: “BOTTLE CASES” AND THEIR DISCONTENTS 
 
In hindsight, it seems odd that courts adopted strict products liability as 
quickly as they did, given the relative rarity of these cases at the time of this 
transition. According to one study, between 1950 and 1970, products liability and 
malpractice cases, combined, amounted to only 1.6 percent of all cases heard by a 
surveyed subset of the nation’s state supreme courts.240 Products cases were not 
especially common at the trial-court level, either; one study of case outcomes in Los 
Angeles Superior Court in 1961 and 1962 identified only fifteen warranty cases 
among the 945 jury verdicts rendered in tort matters during that span.241  
That courts nevertheless rushed en masse toward strict liability to the 
consumer suggests that either they perceived products cases as more common than 
they actually were, or that they regarded the issues presented by these cases as 
particularly troubling or significant. On the latter point, prevailing explanations of 
strict products liability’s rise attribute judicial enthusiasm for this reform to a sense 
that it perfectly captured the intellectual and social zeitgeist. Judges had to sign on, 
lest they were to appear behind the times.242  
Such sentiments probably did influence many judges. Yet there existed 
another, more practical reason for courts to adopt an unvarnished exception to the 
prevailing negligence rule. While strict products liability, whether framed in tort or in 
warranty, had much to commend it from a broad policy perspective, it also had 
certain practical (if less revolutionary) advantages over a negligence regime, especially 
as applied to certain case types that appeared quite often before midcentury judges. 
                                                          
240 Robert A. Kagan et al., The Business of State Supreme Courts, 1870–1970, 30 STAN. L. REV. 121, 145 
(1977).  
241 Los Angeles Jury Verdicts for 1961–1962 Summarized, L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 28, 1963, at 1. Per this 
tabulation, automobile cases dominated the Superior Court’s docket. Warranty cases also were 
outnumbered by slip-and-falls, malpractice cases, and construction accidents. Id. See also Jury Verdict 
Chart for 1954-57 Shows L.A. County Recoveries, METROPOLITAN NEWS (L.A.), April 22, 1958, at 1 
(showing only a handful of warranty cases among Los Angeles Superior Court cases with reported 
jury verdicts during the 1954–1957 time frame).  
242 Priest, supra note 6, at 519. 
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Most notably, strict products liability averted the thorny problems that could arise 
with proving a particular defendant’s fault when there existed multiple parties in the 
supply chain, and a product that could have been compromised anywhere between 
the points of manufacture and sale. This advantage represented an essential 
component of the reformist pitch for strict liability. Here, consider once again 
Prosser’s description of the specific problems with negligence in his Assault on the 
Cathedral article.243 In relating his concerns, Prosser’s usual talent for drumming up 
string citations to hammer home a point momentarily deserted him. Prosser cited 
only one case for the proposition that the product’s manufacturer may be outside the 
jurisdiction, and just one other for the principle that the manufacturer may be 
unknown.244 But when it came to the problem of proving negligence on the part of a 
particular defendant in the supply channel, Prosser had no trouble producing a 
hypothetical with a lengthy list of citations. These cases all involved a single product: 
glass beverage bottles that had exploded, shattered, or chipped.245  
Prosser chose this example wisely, as had Traynor sixteen years earlier in his 
Escola concurrence.246 Bottle lawsuits neatly captured the intractable problems with 
negligence doctrine as applied to certain products cases, and were common (and 
factually similar) enough to make these shortcomings apparent to a broad audience. 
Though this fact may be difficult to appreciate today, as late as 1969 the humble 
glass beverage bottle was described by a National Commission on Product Safety 
official as being among the most dangerous of all household products.247 And 
                                                          
243 Prosser, Assault on the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), supra note 60, at 1116. 
244 Id. 
245 Id.  
246 Likewise, Harper and James would hone in on exploding bottles as a paradigm example of the 
problems that could be associated with proving a particular defendant’s negligence in a products case. 
2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 100, at § 28.14. Other commentators made similar observations. One 
noted: 
A classic example of the difficulties involved in actions based on negligence is 
pointed up in the exploding bottle claims. It is quite generally accepted that the 
almost complete impossibility of proving negligence in such suits together with the 
lack of privity of contract upon which to base a breach of warranty action, is 
responsible for the trend towards adoption of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in 
many states.  
Gleason, supra note 60, at 117. See also James, Products Liability, supra note 100, at 74 (using exploding-
bottle cases as an example of the difficulties associated with connecting a product defect to a 
particular defendant in the supply chain); Robert W. Miller, Manufacturers’ Product Liability Re-Visited, 23 
INS. COUNSEL J. 175 (1956) (discussing numerous bottle cases in connection with a more general 
examination of products liability). 
247 NAT’L COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY, supra note 217, at 441–42 (testimony of Larry A. 
Schott) (describing the results of a survey of insurance claims involving household products, which 
revealed that glass bottles gave rise to the most claims, by far). According to this official, glass bottles 
were associated with 150,000 injuries a year, 90,000 of which involved children ages 14 or younger. Id. 
at 441. See also Paul S. Bergeson, et al., Pop Bottle Explosions, 238 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1048, 1048 (1977) 
(“The problem of explosions of carbonated soft drink bottles is an environmental hazard that has not 
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although Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Company of Fresno248 is the only widely remembered 
bottle case, these matters once provided courts with a great deal of business.249 
Stacks of reported cases dealt with the aftermath of a bottle that had fractured or 
exploded.250 In the fifteen years prior to 1963, the supreme courts of more than half 
of the states took up at least one of these matters.251 Indeed, bottle cases may have 
been the most common of all products-liability lawsuits.252 These cases were well-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
received adequate attention in the medical literature but appears to be of substantial magnitude.”). 
248 Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944). 
249 See Julien, Trial Techniques, supra note 231, at 404 (describing bottle cases as “a real staple in 
products liability”).  
250 In 1960, Roscoe Pound identified 133 published decisions involving exploding bottles, coming 
from 31 different jurisdictions. Roscoe Pound, The Problem of the Exploding Bottle, 40 B.U. L. REV. 167, 
169 (1960). See also Paul D. Kaufman, Torts, in 1944 ANN. SURV. OF AM. LAW, 938, 954 (1945) (“The 
bottle cases continue without abatement. Standardization of judicial treatment would seem to be 
indicated.”) (footnote omitted); Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., Comments on Recent Important Personal Injury 
(Tort) Cases, 25 NACCA L.J. 47, 99 (1960) (referencing a “floodtide” of bursting-bottle cases); Walter 
M. Clark, Note, The Applicability of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur to Cases Involving Bursting Bottles, 1951 
WASH U. L.Q. 216, 216 (1951) (“The past few decades have seen the rise of considerable litigation 
concerning injuries to persons resulting from bursting or exploding bottles.”); C.S. Patrinelis, 
Annotation, Res Ipsa Loquitur as Applied to Bursting of Bottled Beverages, Food Containers, Etc., 4 A.L.R. 2d 
466 (1949) (listing bottle cases). 
251 At least 28 state supreme courts decided at least one injury-by-bottle case during this span (with 
only the last decision listed in jurisdictions entertaining more than one of these cases): Alabama 
(Florence Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Sullivan, 65 So.2d 169 (Ala. 1953)), Arkansas (Coca-Cola Bottling 
Co of Fort Smith, Ark. v. Hicks, 223 S.W.2d 762 (Ark. 1949)); California (Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling 
Co. of Fresno, 247 P.2d 344 (Cal. 1952)), Colorado (Chapman v. Redwine, 370 P.2d 147 (Colo. 
1962)), Connecticut (Crisanti v. Cremo Brewing Co., 72 A.2d 655 (Conn. 1950)), Delaware (Ciociola 
v. Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 172 A.2d 252 (Del. 1961)); Florida (Burkett v. Panama City 
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 93 So.2d 580 (Fla. 1957)), Kansas (Morrison v. Kansas City Coca-Cola 
Bottling Co., 263 P.2d 217 (Kan. 1953)), Kentucky (Bogie v. Royal Crown Bottling Co. of Danville, 
Inc. (Ky. 1961)); Maryland (Joffre v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 158 A.2d 631 (Md. 1960)), 
Massachusetts (Selissen v. Empire Bottling Co., 180 N.E.2d 324 (Mass. 1962)), Michigan (Pattinson v. 
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Port Huron, 52 N.W.2d 699 (Mich. 1952)), Minnesota (Johnson v. Coca 
Cola Bottling Co. of Willmar, 51 N.W.2d 573 (Minn. 1952)), Mississippi (Johnson v. Coca-Cola 
Bottling Co., 125 So.2d 537 (Miss. 1960)), Missouri (Maybach v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 222 S.W.2d 
87 (Mo. 1949)), New Hampshire (Smith v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 92 A.2d 58 (N.H. 1952)), New 
Jersey (Bornstein v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., 139 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1958)), New York (Day v. Grand 
Union Co., 109 N.E.2d 609 (N.Y. 1952)) North Carolina (Graham v. Winston Coca-Cola Bottling 
Co., 125 S.E.2d 429 (N.C. 1962)), North Dakota (Kuntz v. McQuade, 95 N.W.2d 430 (N.D. 1959)), 
Oklahoma (Michel v. Branham, 327 P.2d 440 (Okla. 1958)), Oregon (Robertson v. Coca Cola Bottling 
Co. of Walla Walla, 247 P.2d 217 (Or. 1952)), Pennsylvania (Braccia v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of 
Philadelphia, 157 A.2d 747 (Pa. 1960)), South Carolina (Boyd v. Marion Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 126 
S.E.2d 178 (S.C. 1962)), Tennessee (Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Crow, 291 S.W.2d 589 (Tenn. 
1956)), Texas (Hankins v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 249 S.W.2d 1008 (Tex. 1952)), West Virginia 
(Ferrell v. Royal Crown Bottling Co. of Charleston, W. Va., 109 S.E.2d 489 (W.Va. 1959)); and 
Wisconsin (Weggeman v. Seven-Up Bottling Co.,  93 N.W.2d 467 (Wis. 1958)). 
252 To probe this point, a search was conducted of all state supreme court decisions issued between 
January 1, 1955 and December 31, 1959, that have been tagged with West Reporter Service Key 313A 
(Products Liability). This query returned 85 decisions. Notwithstanding the key, some of these 
decisions were not “true” products-liability cases, in that the gravamen of the plaintiff’s claim or 
claims concerned negligence on the part of a product user, rather than a defect in the product itself. 
Nevertheless, the products involved in these cases provide some indication of the sorts of products-
41 
 
known among academics and practitioners, as well. Numerous law-review articles 
addressed exploding-bottle lawsuits and the problems they presented,253 and NACCA 
seminars often included presentations on how to try these matters.254  
Bottle cases were common throughout the early-to-mid 1900s because of a 
robust claim consciousness of the sort discussed in the prior narrative. Glass 
beverage bottles were ubiquitous from the early 1900s, when new technologies 
appeared that allowed for their mass manufacture,255 through the 1970s, when they 
were overtaken first by aluminum cans equipped with the novel “pop-top” 
mechanism,256 and later by plastic containers.257 Throughout this span, when one of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
liability claims being pressed at that time. In declining order of frequency with which they appeared, 
the products associated with these cases were: beverage bottles (fifteen cases); automobiles (eight 
cases); tractors and tractor accessories (four cases each); mink feed, rifles (three cases each); firearms 
cartridges, liniments (two cases each); antiseptic, a baler, a building truss, carbon tetrachloride, cattle 
feed, a cautery instrument, cement, cement base paint, a chair, cinder blocks, a concrete mixer, 
concrete, concrete slabs, an escalator, feed barrels, fish food, flea repellant, floor finish, a furnace, a 
gas meter, a gas ranger, gasoline, a glass door, a glass jar, hair dye, a harvester, a house trailer, an ice 
crushing machine, insecticide, a kerosene wallpaper steaming machine, liquefied natural gas, lockers, a 
mixer machine, a perfume bottle, a portable grain elevator, a power mower, a refrigerator, sausage, a 
scaffold, shampoo, a steam pipe, a stepladder, steel, suntan lotion, turkey feed, a valve, wood 
preservative, and an X-ray cable (one case each).  
In an identical search performed on caselaw issued one decade earlier (i.e., state supreme court cases 
decided between 1945 to 1949), the proportion of bottle cases among the 48 cases marked with a 
Products Liability key was even more pronounced. Beverage bottles were involved in fifteen of these 
cases, as compared with automobiles (three cases); pesticide, a water heater (two cases each); an 
abrasive cutting-off wheel, antifreeze, a baler, a beer barrel, carbon tetrachloride, a cosmetic box, 
fungicide, a fur collar, a furnace, a gas heater, glass, hair lacquer, hay, hydrofluoric acid, an ice-scoring 
machine, liquid heat quench, milling machinery, perfume, a portable grain elevator, a rail-support 
hanger, seed corn drier, shampoo, a stove, stove polish, sulphuric acid, and a vulcanizing machine 
(one case each). 
253 E.g., Will D. Davis, Liability of Manufacturers of Bottled Beverages, 5 BAYLOR L. REV. 258 (1953); 
William E. Knight, Let the Bottler Beware!, 21 INS. COUNS. J. 72 (1954); Pound, supra note 250; Craig 
Spangenberg, Exploding Bottles, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 516 (1963); Alfred L. Steff, Jr., The Exploding Bottle: 
Why Not Absolute Liability?, 26 U. PITT. L. REV. 115 (1964); Leon Whitehurst, Jr., Torts: Res Ipsa 
Loquitur in Exploding Bottle Cases, 1 U. FLA. L. REV. 470, 472 (“with each new application of res ipsa 
loquitur the growing majority of American courts move nearer to the imposition of absolute liability 
upon the bottler.”); Res Ipsa Loquitur – Explosion of Bottle, CENTRAL L.J., Apr. 22, 1921, at 290; Clark, 
supra note 250. 
254 E.g., Products Liability, supra note 220, at 297 (comments of Alfred S. Julien). See also J. Campbell 
Palmer III, Advances in Exploding Bottle Cases, NACCA THIRTEENTH ANN. CONVENTION 1959 191 
(1960). 
255 Machinery that could mass-produce glass bottles was invented in 1907. U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT 
SAFETY COMMISSION, HAZARD ANALYSIS: BOTTLES FOR CARBONATED SOFT DRINKS 1 (1975). Some 
of these bottles were “returnable.” The cleaning and reuse of these bottles subjected them to 
significant wear-and-tear, making them more prone to breakage. In 1948, there appeared 
“nonreturnable” bottles, which avoided the problems of reuse, but at a price. Nonreturnable bottles 
were made of thinner glass, and may have been more likely to explode upon initial use. Id.  
256 E.C. Fraze invented a practical pull-top for beverage canisters in 1962, MASS PRODUCTION: 
PRODUCTS FROM PHAIDON DESIGN CLASSICS, VOLUME TWO 592 (2009); E.C. Fraze, 76; Designed Pull 
Tab, N.Y. TIMES, October 28, 1989, at 11. This invention (and its successor, the ring top) solved a 
problem that, up to that point, had prevented the widespread use of metal cans as beverage 
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these bottles suddenly ruptured, it was easy for would-be plaintiffs to appreciate that 
they had suffered an injury attributable to an outside force rather than their own 
fault.258 Enough bottles exploded, shattered, or chipped to inflict a substantial 
number of cut fingers and gouged eyes,259 but not so many that people appreciated 
these harms as the price paid for a “pause that refreshes.”260 Quite the contrary; these 
injuries seemed completely at odds with the pleasant messages conveyed by beverage 
companies’ omnipresent advertising.261 Finally, the popularity and notoriety of a 
related variety of lawsuit, the “mouse in a bottle” adulterated-beverage claim, may 
have conditioned prospective plaintiffs and their lawyers to regard bottlers as entities 
susceptible to suit in tort.262    
Given these circumstances, people seriously injured by glass bottles readily 
appreciated that they might have a claim, and found lawyers to take their cases.263 But 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
containers. 
257 Glenn Fowler, N.C. Wyeth, Inventor, Dies at 78; Developed the Plastic Soda Bottle, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 
1990, at 12. Today, soda sold in glass bottles accounts for only two percent of all soda sales. Paul 
Ziobro, Glass Bottles Lend Pop to Soda Makers, WALL ST. J. (June 23, 2013, 9:06 P.M.), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324577904578557683250090950. 
258 Once these cases started to appear, there may have been a “snowball effect,” with other would-be 
plaintiffs and their attorneys becoming conditioned to regard bottlers and bottle manufacturers as 
entities amenable to suit. Cf. TRISTAN DONOVAN, FIZZ: HOW SODA SHOOK UP THE WORLD 77–78 
(2014) (discussing various types of claims brought against soda bottlers, and the bottlers’ response). 
One datapoint that suggests that people injured by bursting bottles were especially cognizant of the 
possibility of recovery involves the frequency with which these individuals filed insurance claims. At 
least in the 1960s, people injured by bottles appear to have filed more insurance claims, on a per-
injury basis, than people injured by other products. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PRODUCT 
SAFETY, supra note 217, at 447 (statement of Larry A. Schott) (discussing how far more insurance 
claims were filed for injuries associated with glass bottles than were filed for injuries associated with 
power lawn mowers, even though the two types of products produced roughly equal injury tolls.). 
259 E.g., Weggeman v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 93 N.W.2d 467, 471 (Wis. 1958) (referencing a damages 
demand of $31,537 in an exploding-bottle case where the glass had put out a child’s eye); Ray R. 
Christensen, Exploding Bottles, 10 AM. JUR. TRIALS 381, 388 (1965) (discussing the types of injuries that 
appeared in exploding bottle cases); Morton Mintz, Insurers Report High Claims of Injury by Exploding 
Bottles, WASH. POST, July 30, 1969, at A2 (discussing the injuries that children had suffered due to 
exploding or broken bottles). 
260 Andrew Dingwall, Exploding Bottles, 11 NACCA L.J. 158, 170 (1953) (“the public knows nothing of 
the ‘idiosyncracies of glass’ especially with regard to internal damage and does not expect to handle 
beverage bottles with all the tenderness of a new father for his new born child.”). See also  NAT’L 
COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY, supra note 217, at 567–68 (statement of Owens-Illinois, Inc.) 
(observing that Owens-Illinois manufactured approximately 12 billion soft drink and beer bottles 
annually between 1965 and 1968, but encountered fewer than 90 bottle claims and lawsuits each year). 
261 For an example of judicial notice being taken of soda companies’ prolific advertising campaigns, 
see Le Blanc v. Louisiana Coca Cola Bottling Co., 60 So.2d 873, 874–75 (La. 1952). 
262 See DONOVAN, supra note 258, at 77–78 (discussing the various types of lawsuits alleged against 
soda bottlers, and the bottlers’ response). 
263 More speculatively, the abundance of published appellate decisions that involved bottle cases also 
may have owed to particularly aggressive defenses put on in these matters. A plaintiff’s attorney 
testified before the National Commission on Product Safety in 1969 that the defendants in bottle 
cases “generally don’t settle them,” partially because “it was very difficult to prove” these cases—at 
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regardless of whether a plaintiff sued the bottle’s manufacturer, the bottler who filled 
it with a drink, the retailer who sold the product,264 or some combination of these 
defendants, she usually had a tough row to hoe in proving negligence.265 Even 
assuming a jurisdiction had adopted the MacPherson doctrine, removing privity as an 
issue in most negligence cases,266 the mere fact of a broken or exploding bottle did 
not necessarily spell negligence on the part of the manufacturer, bottler, or retailer, 
either individually or collectively. Each of these defendants could point a finger at 
the others as the culpable parties, and even a bottle that had been created, cleaned, 
filled, and inspected with reasonable care could break or explode for unknown 
reasons.267  
When a plaintiff could not point to any specific act of negligence and sought 
to rely on res ipsa loquitur as a path toward recovery, she encountered several 
obstacles. The offending bottle typically had been placed into several parties’ hands 
as part of the supply chain, and the plaintiff herself often had custody of the bottle 
for some time prior to its rupture. These facts meant a given defendant lacked the 
“exclusive control” of the harm-causing instrumentality that courts traditionally 
demanded as a prerequisite for application of res ipsa loquitur.268  
Unsurprisingly, some judges tinkered with existing doctrine to provide a 
remedy, or at least a jury, to sympathetic plaintiffs.269 Writing in 1960, Roscoe Pound 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
least, prior to the adoption of strict liability in tort. NAT’L COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY, supra 
note 217, at 484–85 (testimony of James J. Reidy). 
264 Of these possible defendants, bottlers were identified as plaintiffs’ “prime target” in bottle cases. 
Christensen, supra note 259, at 425. This same resource described suits against bottle manufacturers as 
rare, due to jurisdictional issues that sometimes appeared, and difficulties associated with proving the 
manufacturer’s fault. Id. at 402. As for retailers, “[a]s a tactical matter a plaintiff suing the bottler on a 
negligence theory will often join the retailer as a defendant on a warranty theory,” for reasons 
including the fact that “[t]he memory of the retailer’s clerks is often greatly improved under these 
circumstances.” Id. at 401. 
265 Gleason, supra note 60, at 117; Clark, supra note 250, at 216 (“In order to recover from the 
manufacturer, a person so injured is confronted with a serious proof problem.”).  
266 For a sample of the many cases that expressly rejected a privity requirement in bottle cases 
sounding in negligence, as opposed to warranty, see Macres v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 287 N.W.2d 
922, 925–26 (Mich. 1939); Stolle v. Anheuser-Busch, 271 S.W. 497, 499 (Mo. 1925); Smith v. Peerless 
Glass Co., 181 N.E. 576, 577 (N.Y. 1932); Grant v. Graham Chero-Cola Bottling Co., 97 S.E. 27, 28–
29 (N.C. 1918). 
267 See Dingwall, supra note 260, at 167–70 (discussing the difficulties associated with detecting a 
defective bottle). Most plaintiffs’ attorneys focused blame on the soda bottler, rather than the 
manufacturer of the bottle or the retailer. Among the errors attributed to the bottler, it was believed 
that methods used to clean bottles introduced “chattersleek,” a scoring of their interiors that might 
make them prone to explode. Products Liability, supra note 220, at 291 (comments of Alfred S. Julien). 
See also Russell L. Wald, Due Care in Handling Bottle Containing Carbonated Beverage, 33 AM. JUR. PROOF 
OF FACTS 2d 1, 9 (1983) (discussing the various ways in which the integrity of a glass bottle can 
become compromised); Dingwall, supra note 260, at 167–69 (same). 
268 Mark Shain, Res Ipsa Loquitur, 17 S. CAL. L. REV. 187, 192 (1944). 
269 See Evangelio v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., 158 N.E.2d 342, 346 n.3 (Mass. 1959) (relating a 
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identified seven different approaches courts had taken to the negligence issue in 
exploding-bottle cases.270 Several of these approaches liberalized res ipsa loquitur 
doctrine to allow plaintiffs an inference of negligence, at least against the bottler, 
notwithstanding the lack of exclusive control.271 One case cluster allowed the 
plaintiff a res ipsa loquitur inference provided that she introduced some evidence that 
indicated the bottle had not been abused or mishandled after it left the defendant’s 
hands.272 Other courts allowed the plaintiff to invoke res ipsa loquitur if she showed 
that other bottles filled by the bottler had exploded around the time of the accident 
in question.273 And still another approach allowed a plaintiff to rely upon res ipsa 
loquitur merely upon establishing that her bottle had exploded, “since reasonable men 
know that when bottles are properly manufactured and filled, they do not blow 
up.”274  
The increasingly aggressive application of res ipsa loquitur in bottle cases275 
meant that by midcentury, many observers understood that some courts were 
applying negligence in name only in these matters, and justifying this sleight-of-hand 
on public-policy grounds.276 One such commentator, summing up the state of the 
law in 1960, wrote that “it seems obvious from the talk of public policy which 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
perceived transition toward liberalized application of res ipsa loquitur in bottle cases); Johnson v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 125 So.2d 537, 541–42 (Miss. 1960) (same); James, Products Liability, supra note 100, 
at 76–77 (same); Patrinelis, supra note 250, at 467–68 (same). 
270 Pound, supra note 250, at 169–170. 
271 Id. See also Dix W. Noel, Manufacturers of Products—The Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24 TENN. L. REV. 
963, 978 (1957) (discussing the trend toward application of liberalized versions of res ipsa loquitur in 
exploding-bottle cases). 
272 E.g., Florence Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Sullivan, 65 So.2d 169, 175 (Ala. 1953) (stating that the 
“general trend” in exploding-bottle cases was to adopt this approach); Thompson v. Burke 
Engineering Sales Co., 106 N.W.2d 351, 353–54 (Iowa 1960) (discussing this line of precedent). See 
also James, Products Liability, supra note 100, at 76 (“Today . . . a majority of courts seem willing to 
invoke res ipsa loquitur in bursting bottle cases, where a proper foundation is laid.”). 
273 E.g., Merchant v. Columbia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 51 S.E.2d 749, 751 (S.C. 1949). See also 
Patrinelis, supra note 250, at 479 (discussing this approach). 
274 Ford Motor Co. v. Fish, 335 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Ark. 1960). A few courts, but only a few, also 
authorized the use of res ipsa loquitur to generate an inference of negligence against multiple defendants 
in the supply chain. E.g., Nichols v. Nold, 268 P.2d 317, 323 (Kan. 1953); Loch v. Confair, 93 A.2d 
451, 454 (Pa. 1953). 
275 See, e.g., Riecke v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass’n, 227 S.W. 631 (Mo. App. 1921) (affirming the 
use of res ipsa loquitur in an exploding-bottle case where the defendant bought “only the highest grade 
bottles,” part of each order was tested before purchase, the bottles’ mold also was tested prior to its 
use in the manufacture of bottles, the substance (Bevo) poured into the bottles was “not naturally an 
explosive substance,” and the case before the court “was the first time that a bottle had ever 
exploded.”). 
276 See Knight, supra note 253, at 7 (“it is apparent that the present trend is toward absolute liability in 
bottle cases.”); Whitehurst, supra note 253, at 472 (“with each new application of res ipsa loquitur the 
growing majority of American courts move nearer to the imposition of absolute liability upon the 
bottler.”). 
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constantly recurs in opinions, that courts are designedly imposing strict liability as a 
means of ensuring that soft drink manufacturers take consummate protections.”277  
But these reforms did not assist every plaintiff in a bottle case. Even under 
liberalized regimes, many plaintiffs could not show that the bottle in question had 
been handled reasonably carefully since it left the bottler’s hands.278 Most bottle cases 
therefore remained difficult to prove when grounded in negligence.279 In these 
situations, the law of warranty provided the plaintiffs’ only hope. But many courts 
continued to insist upon privity in bottle cases when a breach of warranty was 
alleged.280  
                                                          
277 Graham L. Fricke, Personal Injury Damages in Products Liability, 6 VILL. L. REV. 1, 32 (1960). Four 
years earlier, a similar observation had been made regarding judicial handling of a close cousin of the 
exploding-bottle line of cases, the mouse-in-a-bottle case: 
New York, for what appears to be the first time, applied res ipsa to a foreign-
object-in-a-bottle case. The facts were typical. The bottling company’s evidence 
indicated that a mouse couldn’t possibly have been in a bottle of coke, but there it 
was just the same. This case is a good illustration of the way strict liability is 
extending its grip in the area of manufacturer’s liability. Courts more and more are 
taking the attitude that the industry must pay its way, regardless of “fault” in the 
conventional sense. Once res ipsa is applied in a bottle case, for instance, the 
bottler might as well give up the ghost. If he introduces no evidence, he is sure to 
lose. If, on the other hand, he introduces evidence that his washing, capping, and 
inspection systems are excellent, he will probably lose anyway because the jury will 
conclude that, in the precautions are so high grade, some employee must have 
erred in applying them. It is true for all practical purposes, therefore, that res ipsa in 
such cases “has ceased to be a procedure for proving actual negligence to sustain 
liability, and has become a means of establishing a basis for liability irrespective of 
negligence.” 
John V. Thornton & Harold F. McNiece, Torts, in 1955 ANN. SURV. OF AM. L., 433, 442 (Richard M. 
McKay, ed., 1956) (footnote omitted). 
278 E.g., Joffre v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 158 A.2d 631, 636–37 (Md. 1960); Trust v. Arden 
Farms Co., 324 P.2d 583, 585–86 (Cal. 1958); Burkett v. Panama City Coca-Cola Bottling Co. 93 
So.2d 580, 582 (Fla. 1957). 
279 See Julien, Trial Techniques, supra note 231, at 404 (describing bottle cases as “a real challenge”).  
280 E.g., Ciociola v. Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 172 A.2d 252, 257 (Del. 1961) (rejecting a 
plaintiff’s claim in a bottle case on lack-of-privity grounds); Burke v. Assoc. Coca-Cola Bottling 
Plants, Inc., 181 N.Y.S.2d 800, 801 (N.Y. App. Div. 1959) (same); Prince v. Smith, 119 S.E.2d 923, 
925 (N.C. 1961) (same); Wolfe v. S.H. Wintman Co., 139 A.2d 84, 86 (R.I. 1958) (same). See also 
Christensen, supra note 259, at 385–86 (observing that in exploding-bottle cases, “the principal legal 
problem [for the plaintiff] is the requirement of privity between the plaintiff and the defendant.”); 
Hursh, Privity of Contract as Essential to Recovery in Action Based on Theory Other than Negligence, Against 
Manufacturer or Seller of Product Alleged to Have Caused Injury, supra note 75, at 44–45 (discussing the 
privity rule). Where the plaintiff had purchased the bottle, she typically could sue the retailer for 
breach of an implied warranty. Christensen, supra note 259, at 386. But non-purchasing plaintiffs 
lacked privity with even the retailer, and the bottler, not the retailer, was generally understood as the 
party most to blame for an exploding bottle. Products Liability, supra note 220, at 291 (comments of 
Alfred S. Julien). An additional problem that vexed plaintiffs in some states involved judicial limitation 
of implied warranties to the contents of a container, as opposed to the contents and container 
combined. See Christensen, supra note 259, at 386 (discussing this issue in the context of exploding-
bottle lawsuits). 
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The ongoing post-World War II trend toward lifting the privity requirement 
in food cases thus presented an opportunity for plaintiffs in bottle cases, and a 
challenge for judges. Bottle cases stood at a crucial analogical pivot, halfway between 
food and all other consumer products. On the one hand, increasingly widespread 
rejection of a privity requirement in adulterated food cases begged the question of 
why defective food containers should be treated any differently. Why should the 
plaintiff’s recovery depend upon whether a soda bottle chipped on the inside, 
depositing glass shards into a consumed drink, or on the outside, sending the shards 
into the plaintiff’s hand?281 On the other hand, if courts accepted this analogy and 
lifted the privity requirement for food containers, too, such a holding contained no 
apparent limiting principle. If food containers, why not automobiles, space heaters, 
or any other consumer good? In the 1950s, a few courts leapt into the breach, 
rejecting a privity requirement for warranty claims in bottle cases.282 It was around 
this time that proposals for strict products liability in tort began to coalesce into a 
workable rule, through the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A.  
Would some variation of Section 402A have come about, even without 
bursting-bottle lawsuits? Almost certainly. Thought leaders like Prosser and Traynor 
had lobbied for a strict-liability approach to products problems, grounded in tort, for 
more than twenty years.283 Bottle cases only typified, rather than exhausted, their 
concerns. And yet these cases deserve more than the obscurity in which they have 
languished. Each time a bottle case appeared, from the 1940s through the 1960s,284 it 
reminded even the most unimaginative judges of the nagging problems created by 
the prevailing rules. The recurrence of these disputes, meanwhile, allowed courts to 
use them as an ongoing experiment with negligence doctrine, trying to blaze a path 
around the problems or proof associated with these cases (and other, similar case 
types as well). In the end, these efforts gravitated toward a negligence approach in 
name that imposed strict liability in fact. Judges who surveyed this record likely 
found that it justified their more straightforward embrace of strict liability, whether 
                                                          
281 Canada Dry Bottling Co. of Fla. v. Shaw, 118 So.2d 840, 843 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1960), disapproved by 
Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 177 So.2d 221, 222 (Fla. 1965) (drawing this analogy). See also Note, Strict 
Products Liability and the Bystander, supra note 77, at 929 (making this argument); Richard G. Wilson, 
Products Liability – Part II – The Protection of the Producing Enterprise, 43 CAL. L. REV. 809, 821 (1955) (“it 
is not self-evident that a marketer of a bottle which explodes should be held to bear less risks than the 
marketer of a bottle which turns out to contain a foreign substance.”). 
282 E.g., Canada Dry Bottling Co. of Fla. v. Shaw, 118 So.2d at 843; Nichols v. Nold, 258 P.2d 317, 
323 (Kan. 1953); Mahoney v. Shaker Square Beverages, 102 N.E.2d 281, 289 (Oh. Com. Pl. 1951). 
283 See text accompanying notes 61–63, supra.  
284 The California Supreme Court, for example, heard three more bottle cases during the interval 
between Escola and Greenman. Trust v. Arden Farms Co., 324 P.2d 583 (Cal. 1958); Zentz v. Coca Cola 
Bottling Co. of Fresno, 247 P.2d 344 (Cal. 1952); and Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 203 P.2d 522 
(Cal. 1949). These cases represented a substantial subset of all products cases heard by that court over 
this span. See also Simmons v. Rhodes & Jamieson, Limited, 293 P.2d 26 (Cal. 1956) (cement); Rose v. 
Melody Lane of Wilshire, 247 P.2d 335 (Cal. 1952) (collapsing stool installed at a restaurant).  
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couched in warranty or in tort.285 
 Meanwhile, even if bottle cases did not prompt Section 402A, judging from 
Dean Prosser’s pointed reference to bottle cases in his Assault on the Citadel article, 
they likely informed the approach toward product defects that he promoted in the 
Restatement. Much ink has been spilled over Prosser’s intentions in drafting Section 
402A. In particular, there exists an ongoing dispute over whether Section 402A 
contemplated only what are today known as “manufacturing” defects (with other 
products claims being left to negligence law), or both these and other types of 
product-defect allegations, such as lawsuits premised on unsafe designs and 
inadequate warnings.286 The bottle cases suggest that this argument may be 
orthogonal to the issue as Prosser perceived it, if one assumes his thinking was 
framed by the recurring case tropes of his era. A glass bottle could explode or shatter 
for any of several reasons. Among them, these bottles could be designed with glass 
too thin to withstand successive reuse,287 a bottle could contain an inclusion or other 
irregularities that made it more prone to shatter,288 the bottler could abrade and 
thereby weaken the glass in cleaning prior to reuse,289 it could over-carbonate the 
beverage inside,290 or it could damage the bottle when affixing the bottle cap.291 
Alternatively, the glass could be damaged by careless handling by the distributor, 
retailer, plaintiff, or someone else,292 or the glass simply might break for reasons 
unknown.293 Today, some of these fact patterns would be classified as involving 
“manufacturing” defects, others as “design” defects, and still others as negligence. 
To Prosser, an essential point of strict liability was to make these distinctions 
essentially irrelevant to recovery, particularly as against the retailer. Per the 
Restatement, the liability issue would instead simply hinge on whether the product 
had failed to satisfy the expectations of a reasonable consumer. A soda bottle that 
                                                          
285 Indeed, bottle cases had served as a testing ground for doctrinal reforms well before the adoption 
of strict products liability in tort. See Hewitt v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 284 P.2d 471, 475 (Utah 
1955) (likening the exploding tire in the matter before the court to the exploding bottles addressed in 
other cases, and concluding that the present case should be resolved under res ipsa loquitur rules 
developed in the bottle cases). 
286 Compare George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 2301, 
2303 (1989) (“the [creators of Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A] intended the Section’s 
strict liability standard, with minor exceptions, to apply only to what we now call manufacturing 
defect cases.”) with Michael D. Green, The Unexpected Congruity of the Second and Third Torts Restatements 
on Design Defects, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 807, 836 (2009) (“Section 402A and the scholars and courts that 
crafted it were concerned about easy cases in which products failed in performing at a minimal level 
of safety. . . . In this era, the type of defect was not important.”).  
287 Wald, supra note 267, at 9; Dingwall, supra note 260, at 167. 
288 Wald, supra note 267, at 9; Dingwall, supra note 260, at 167. 
289 Dingwall, supra note 260, at 168–69. 
290 Wald, supra note 267, at 10. 
291 Dingwall, supra note 260, at 161. 
292 Wald, supra note 267, at 10. 
293 See James, supra note 100, at 74–75 (discussing these possibilities).  
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inexplicably exploded in the plaintiff’s hands certainly qualified under this test, 
regardless of the source of the defect.294   
In the final analysis, perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the bottle cases is 
the fact that strict products liability, as extended to all products, was built atop a 
fairly limited universe of decided cases,295 and the most numerous of these case types 
has virtually disappeared.296 For several decades, bottle cases appeared in the 
background (and sometimes the forefront) of the debate over products liability. 
Even if these cases were banal, their ubiquity and their attendant body of caselaw 
made them an integral part of the legal culture. Now they are mostly gone, and 
essentially forgotten. Strict product liability lives on as a headstone. As a broader and 
more debatable lesson, one might infer from this disconnect that the different 
lifespans of specific case types on the one hand, and doctrine on the other, can make 
it difficult to appreciate, in hindsight, the specific concerns that prompted judges of 
other eras to adopt a given doctrinal innovation. Where now-defunct cases 
contributed to a still-intact rule, modern observers may overestimate the importance 
of broad policy arguments in making the case for change, and underestimate the 
contributions made by particular problems associated with the most visible and 
common cases of an earlier era.   
Of course, judges vexed by bottle cases did not necessarily have to adopt a 
tort solution to the problems presented by these matters; the law of warranty, with a 
few adjustments, might have done the trick just fine. The next section of this Article 
begins at this junction, and discusses why so many courts adopted an approach to 
products liability grounded in tort law.  
                                                          
294 This perspective on original intentions, if credited, would tend to support the position taken by 
Professor Green. See Green, supra note 286, at 836.  
295 Priest, supra note 6, deconstructed the seemingly voluminous body of case citations that Prosser 
tendered in support of Section 402A, and concluded that few supported a broad strict-liability-in-tort 
principle. Id. at 514–17. 
296 The infrequency with which bottle cases appear today captures in miniature the rarity of modern 
litigation over “manufacturing” defects, the sort of defect (to impose modern terminology on the 
cases of yesteryear) likely associated with most exploding or collapsing bottles. By the mid-1980s, at 
the latest, design-defect cases were far more numerous than were manufacturing-defect cases. 
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 303 (1987) 
(charting the number of design-defect and manufacturing-defect cases heard by the federal courts of 
appeals between January 1982 and November 1984); STAPLETON, supra note 137, at 30 (observing that 
since the early 1980s, defective-design claims “have formed the overwhelming bulk of US product 
lawsuits”). See also Peter Nash Swisher, Products Liability Tort Reform: Why Virginia Should Adopt the 
Henderson-Twerski Proposed Revision of Section 402A Restatement (Second) of Torts, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 857, 
890 (1993) ( “[M]anufacturing defect injuries are random and relatively rare events.”); Aaron D. 
Twerski, Chasing the Illusory Pot of Gold at the End of the Rainbow: Negligence and Strict Liability in Design 
Defect Litigation, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 7, 18 (2006) (“[m]anufacturing defects are rare events”). 
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V. THE CONTINGENCY NARRATIVE: TORT VS. WARRANTY 
 
A third and final story concerns how tort eclipsed warranty as the dominant 
method of framing a products-liability claim. As late as the 1950s, most of those who 
saw some form of strict products liability as inevitable assumed that this transition 
would occur within the prevailing warranty rubric.297 Defying these expectations, tort 
law came to conquer the field of consumer protection, with warranty law now 
occupying a backup role.  
In hindsight, it is easy to attribute this shift to certain perceived advantages of 
a “pure” tort approach, such as that embodied in Restatement (Second) of Torts 
Section 402A, over a system grounded in warranty. Unlike warranty, a tort solution 
was not encumbered by notice and disclaimer rules associated with generic sales law. 
The tort approach also did not suffer from decades of name-calling by Prosser, who 
was fond of describing warranty as “a freak hybrid born of the illicit intercourse of 
tort and contract,”298 among other choice epithets. But none of these problems were 
intractable—Henningsen refused to honor a seemingly airtight disclaimer of 
warranties,299 and Greenman gainsaid a notice requirement in warranty suits300 before 
going on to recognize a tort remedy. Meanwhile, warranty had its competitive 
advantages, too, the most important of which was inertia.301 The fact that even today, 
                                                          
297 Gillam, supra note 42, at 124. See also Note, Sales-Manufacturer and Dealers-Liability of a Supplier of Goods 
to One Other than His Immediate Vendee, supra note 24, at 322. (“The theory most likely to be relied on 
in the future as a means of holding the manufacturer liable to the ultimate consumer is the theory of 
an implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the ultimate consumer.”). Cf. Titus, supra note 
131, at 781 (“One cannot help concluding that Greenman and section 402A would not have come into 
being if the courts and lawyers had used the Sales Act warranties more creatively.”). 
298 Prosser, Assault on the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), supra note 60, at 1125. This comment 
represented a continuation of Prosser’s longtime preference for a “pure” tort approach to products 
liability over a scheme premised on warranty law. In 1941, he had written: 
it seems far better to discard the troublesome sales doctrine of ‘warranty,’ and 
impose strict liability outright in tort, as a pure matter of social policy. It is only by 
some ‘violent pounding and twisting’ that the concept can be made to yield the 
desired result; and the reliance traditionally necessary to a warranty is not easy to 
find in the case of a consumer who does not even know who made the goods, or 
who has not even made a purchase but is a mere donee.  
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 61, at § 83, quoting Patterson, The 
Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal Devices, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 335, 358 (1924).  
299 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d at 85–107. See also Jeffery W. Deaver, Note, 
Products Liability in New York: Section 2-318 of the U.C.C. – The Amendment Without a Cause, 50 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 61, 70–71 (1981) (discussing New York’s assimilation of the U.C.C., which the state adopted 
in 1964, with its prior recognition of broad warranty protections). 
300 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d at 900. For a discussion of the discretion 
accorded judges in interpreting this requirement, see Morris G. Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products 
Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Commentary on Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and 
Communication Barriers, 17 W. RES. L. REV. 5, 27–29 (1965). 
301 An anecdote underscores this point. Observers were so conditioned to think of products liability in 
warranty terms that the headline for the Los Angeles Daily Journal article that reported the Greenman 
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a handful of states prefer a warranty framework for products claims suggests that the 
broad, swift adoption of the tort approach may have owed to fortuitous 
circumstances as much as any inherent superiority of a tort formulation. Specifically, 
the preference for tort over warranty may owe to the fact that warranty was 
compromised as an alternative to tort at an especially crucial juncture. By the time 
this damage had been repaired, Section 402A already had gained a critical mass of 
adherents.  
A crucial setback for the warranty approach occurred in 1951, when the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, considering a draft 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, rejected a provision that incorporated broad 
warranty protections. A decade earlier, Karl Llewellyn had unsuccessfully sought to 
engraft liberalized privity rules onto the Uniform Sales Act.302 This effort failed,303 
but Llewllyn tried again with the U.C.C. In 1951, Llewellyn prepared a draft of the 
U.C.C. that, within its proposed section 2-318, would have extended express and 
implied warranties to “any natural person who is in the family or household of the 
buyer or who is his guest or one whose relationship to him is such as to make it 
reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods 
and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty.”304  
This approach was rejected in favor of a narrower view. As approved by the 
Conference, section 2-318 extended warranties only to “any natural person who is in 
the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable 
to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is 
injured in person by breach of the warranty.”305 This language excluded persons such 
as employees of the buyer, friends who were not houseguests, and bystanders. 
Meanwhile, in its Comments, the Code expressed a neutral view about whether 
remote purchasers could claim warranty protections, leaving the issue open for 
development in the caselaw.306 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
decision read, “Injured Consumer Need Not Give Notice Under Sales Act.” Injured Consumer Need Not 
Give Notice Under Sales Act, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 30, 1963, at 1. The revolutionary portion of the 
Greenman opinion, grounding the plaintiff’s recovery in tort law, went unmentioned.  
302 Note 63, supra. 
303 Id. 
304 U.C.C. § 2-318 (Proposed Final Draft Spring 1950). A Comment to this section provided that it 
followed “the dominant trend of judicial opinion developed in the light of modern distribution 
methods and the fact of group consumption,” and was “intended to broaden the right and the remedy 
of the consumer in warranty, to free them from any technical rules as to ‘privity’ and to make them, 
insofar as feasible, directly enforceable against the party ultimately responsible for any injury.” Id., 
cmt. 2. 
305 U.C.C. § 2-318 (Final Text Edition November 1951). See also PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR 
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 1966 OFFICIAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMENDMENT OF THE 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 8 (1967) (discussing the history of section 2-318).  
306 U.C.C. § 2-318, cmt. 3 (Official Draft Text and Comments Edition 1952); U.C.C, § 2-318, cmt. 3 
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Section 2-318, as promulgated, quickly become the law in most states. 
Between 1953 and 1967, the Uniform Commercial Code swept the nation, in the 
same way that strict products liability in tort soon would. Only six states had adopted 
the U.C.C. by the end of 1960. But eight states did so in 1961, four more in 1962, ten 
in 1963, one in 1964, thirteen in 1965, five in 1966, and two in 1967, leaving 
Louisiana as the lone holdout.307 (It would join the pack in 1974, adopting the Code 
except for Articles 2 and 2A.)308 The version of the U.C.C. adopted by most states 
parroted the language of section 2-318 as promulgated.309 There were some 
dissenters, however. California and Utah declined to adopt section 2-318.310 In 
California, where the Supreme Court already had extended warranty protections to 
employees of the purchaser,311 concerns existed that the U.C.C.’s privity rules 
represented a “step backward” from the status quo.312 Other states adopted 
counterparts to section 2-318 that incorporated broader warranty protections than 
appeared in the standard text. In 1961 and 1962, respectively, Wyoming and Virginia 
adopted statutes that extended sales warranties to any person “who may reasonably 
be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods” and was “injured in 
person by breach of the warranty”313 (Wyoming) or “a person whom the 
manufacturer or seller might reasonably have expected to use, consume or be 
affected by the goods” (Virginia).314  
Notwithstanding these developments, upon revisiting the privity issue in 
1964 the NCCUSL decided to stand pat with the existing language of section 2-318. 
The Permanent Editorial Board observed that “At present there appears to be no 
national consensus as to the scope of warranty protection which is proper. 
Therefore, no amendment to the Official Text should be made in order to permit the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(1962 Official Text with Comments) (providing that the section was “neutral,” and “not intended to 
enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller’s warranties, given to his buyer who 
resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain.”). 
307 FREDERICK H. MILLER, 12 WEST’S LEGAL FORMS, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS § 1.1 (2013). 
308 Id. 
309 See Brian D. Cochran, Emerging Products Liability Under Section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A 
Survey, 29 BUS. LAWYER 925, 939–45 (1974) (surveying state laws). 
310 William Michael Karnes, Section 2-318 of the UCC: the Sleeping Giant, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 181, 186–
87 (1971). See also California State Bar Committee on the Commercial Code, The Uniform Commercial 
Code – A Special Report by the California State Bar Committee on the Commercial Code, 37 J. ST. B. CAL. 117, 
144 (1962) (explaining why California rejected section 2-318 of the U.C.C.). 
311 Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 353 P.2d 575, 581 (Cal. 1960). 
312 PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE U.C.C., REPORT NO. 2 40 (1964). 
313 Uniform Commercial Code, ch. 219, 1961 Wyo. Sess. Laws 406, 426–27.  
314 An Act to Provide When Lack of Privity Shall Not Be a Defense in Action upon a Warranty or for 
Negligence, ch. 476, 1962 Va. Acts 804, 804. See also William I. Aronwald, Note, Privity and Section 2-
318 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 31 BROOK. L. REV. 367, 370–71 (1964) (discussing the Virginia and 
Wyoming statutes). 
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decisional development of such a consensus.”315 After other states also adopted 
statutes with broadened warranty provisions over the next two years,316 in 1966 the 
U.C.C.’s drafters finally yielded and proposed two “alternatives” (labeled 
“Alternative B” and “Alternative C”) to the pertinent language of section 2-318.317 
These alternatives followed the Virginia and Wyoming models by extending 
warranties to any persons “who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be 
affected by the goods.”318 Alternative B extended warranties only for personal-injury 
claims, while Alternative C did so for all claims.319 By 1974, a total of 17 states had 
adopted either Alternative B or C, or had previously endorsed closely analogous 
provisions.320 
But by then, more than three dozen states had adopted a tort approach to 
strict products liability, and it was too late for warranty to make up its lost advantage. 
The timing of the U.C.C.’s adoption, relative to the Greenman decision and the 
promulgation of the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402, could not have been 
better calibrated to nudge courts toward a torts approach to products-liability cases. 
The narrow warranty protections of the U.C.C. doubtless encouraged courts in 
adopting jurisdictions to look to tort law for a solution to ongoing products 
problems. Even though the U.C.C. was neutral regarding judicial expansion of 
“vertical” privity, at least, the boundary it drew around the family and household 
insofar as “horizontal” privity was concerned may have convinced many judges that 
they would be rewriting recently enacted law, contrary to the legislature’s intent, if 
they cast additional consumer and bystander protections in warranty terms.321   
                                                          
315 PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE U.C.C.,  supra note 312, at 40. This declination caused one 
set of authors to wonder, “After generating the monumental change wrought by the Code, are its 
fathers now afraid to push their luck?” Kroner, et al., supra note 230, at 229. 
316 PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 1966 OFFICIAL 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMENDMENT OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 8 (1967). 
317 Id.  
318 Id.  
319 “Alternative B” provided that a seller’s express or implied warranty would extend to “any natural 
person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is 
injured in person by breach of the warranty.” Id. “Alternative C” extended the warranties to “any 
person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is 
injured by breach of the warranty.” All three Alternatives (the original text now being identified as 
“Alternative A”) provided that the seller could not exclude or limit the operation of this section, at 
least with respect to the person of an individual to whom the warranty, so redefined, extended. Id. 
320 Cochran, supra note 309, at 939–45. In alphabetical order, these states were Alabama, Arkansas, 
Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Dakota, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. 
321 See Kroner, et al., supra note 230, at 226 (observing that in arguing for strict liability, “Plaintiffs will 
probably prefer to rely upon Restatement section 402A because of the reluctance of some courts to 
extend the duty beyond that expressly defined in the Code”); Kames, supra note 310, at 181 (observing 
that the enactment of U.C.C. Section 2-318 in many states “compelled courts to stretch, bend and 
squeeze breach of warranty into the realm of strict liability in tort.”); Comment, UCC Section 2-318: 
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Meanwhile, the excitement that surrounded the development of a coherent 
theory of products liability in tort drowned out, for a few years, concerns that the 
U.C.C.’s warranty provisions displaced or preempted alternative strict-liability 
approaches to products liability.322 Some members of the American Law Institute 
wondered about overlaps between the U.C.C. and the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
Section 402A when drafts of the products-liability provision of the treatise were 
under consideration. These concerns were brushed aside, with Prosser disavowing 
any conflict between the statute and the treatise.323 The first few courts to address the 
subject likewise gave the matter short shrift, waving away defendants’ displacement 
contentions.324  
As years passed, however, it became more difficult to ignore this argument. 
A prominent law-review article concluded that while the U.C.C. contemplated some 
judicial expansion of warranty protections, certain provisions of the U.C.C., such as 
its notice and disclaimer provisions, could not be avoided simply by replacing the 
vocabulary of warranty with that of tort.325 Another author regarded the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Effect on Washington Requirements for Privity in Products Liability Suits, 42 WASH. L. REV. 253, 261 (1966) 
(observing that while “The majority of courts seemingly do not regard section 2-318 as a restraint on 
judicial resolution of the privity issue in warranty actions . . . the danger of a restrictive approach .  . . 
should not be overlooked.”). Cf. Mitchel J. Ezer, Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the California 
Law of Sales Warranties, 8 UCLA L. REV. 281, 327 (1961) (warning that if California were to adopt 
section 2-318, doing so might “inadvertently reverse” recent caselaw that had extended warranties to 
the employees of the product’s purchaser). A relatively recent study of the privity requirement in 
jurisdictions that retain the “standard” language of section 2-318 found a relatively tangled web of 
rules. William L. Stallworth, An Analysis of Warranty Claims Instituted by Non-Privity Plaintiffs in Jurisdictions 
That Have Adopted Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-318 (Alternative A), 20 PEPP. L .REV. 1215, 1220–22 
(1993). 
322 See Titus, supra note 131, at 715 & n. 13. 
323 During the ALI’s consideration of the 1961 draft of Section 402A, Dean Prosser emphasized that 
the U.C.C., in its comments to section 2-318, contemplated possible judicial engrossment of 
warranties to remote purchasers. See Wednesday Morning Session, May 17, 1961, 38 A.L.I. PROC. 19, 77–
78 (1962). The next year, Prosser acknowledged that the Restatement “entrenched” upon the U.C.C. 
insofar as both addressed liability to non-purchasers, but otherwise disclaimed any conflicts. Thursday 
Afternoon Session, May 24, 1962, 39 A.L.I. PROC. 198, 238–240 (1963) (comments of William L. 
Prosser). 
324 Pearson v. Franklin Laboratories, Inc., 254 N.W.2d 133, 139 (S.D. 1977) (“In adopting the 
doctrine of strict liability in tort . . .  we did not pause to consider the potential conflict between the 
warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code and the concept of strict liability. In this we 
were not alone.”). See also Franklin, supra note 80, at 974 (observing that “[r]ecently . . . several cases 
have raised the possibility that the products liability development may be affected, indeed controlled, 
by the Uniform Commercial Code. The possibility has been barely recognized – and still is not fully 
appreciated.”); John W. Wade, Is Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts Preempted by the UCC and 
Therefore Unconstitutional?, 42 TENN. L. REV. 123, 125 (1974) (noting that “up through the time of 
writing, most courts had ignored the preemption argument,” but that there were “indications that 
some judges, at least, may have a feeling of guilt regarding the matter, and the whole atmosphere is 
one suggesting uneasiness and malaise.”). 
325 Franklin, supra note 80. For other law-review articles expressing concern that the U.C.C. may 
preempt or displace a strict-liability approach grounded wholly in tort, see Reed Dickerson, Products 
Liability: Dean Wade and the Constitutionality of Section 402A, 44 TENN. L.R. 205 (1977); Reed Dickerson, 
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displacement issue as a state-by-state affair, with the status of warranty law within a 
jurisdiction prior to its adoption of the U.C.C. dictating whether warranty would 
represent the exclusive vehicle for strict products-liability lawsuits in that state.326 In 
the early 1970s, the first of these arguments found a taker in Oregon Supreme Court 
Chief Justice Kenneth O’Connell, who wrote separately in a products-liability case to 
express his opinion that 
A careful reading of the Uniform Commercial Code reveals that it 
prescribes a legal framework for the recovery of damages for 
personal injuries resulting from defective products. Recovery for 
personal injuries resulting from the negligent conduct of the seller is 
left for the courts to develop. But it is apparent that aside from the 
negligence cases the Code provides an integrated and comprehensive 
scheme under which recovery for personal injuries may be sought 
both by privity and non-privity plaintiffs.327 
None of O’Connell’s colleagues joined his opinion, highlighting the marginal 
nature of the displacement argument at the time. In 1980, however, the Delaware 
Supreme Court unanimously concluded that strict products liability in tort had been 
preempted by the state’s adoption of Alternative B to the U.C.C. in 1966.328 The 
Massachusetts Supreme Court similarly observed that the Bay State legislature’s 
“expansive amendments” to the U.C.C., added in 1971, meant that no space 
remained for strict products liability.329 Through these amendments, the court said, 
the Massachusetts legislature had “transformed warranty liability into a remedy 
intended to be fully as comprehensive as the strict liability theory of recovery that 
has been adopted by a great many other jurisdictions.”330 
The point is not that this preemption argument is correct, only that it might 
have persuaded a few more judges, had it more time to develop before courts rushed 
to adopt strict products liability in tort. Such an interval also would have allowed 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Was Prosser’s Folly Also Traynor’s? or Should The Judge’s Monument Be Moved to a Firmer Site? 2 HOFSTRA 
L.R. 469 (1974); Donald J. Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between the Uniform 
Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 692 (1965); Shanker, supra note 300. 
Surveying the literature in 1983, John Wade observed that “the preemption viewpoint may perhaps be 
the weightier side from the standpoints of both the number of articles and the vehemence of the 
position taken.” Wade, Tort Liability for Products Causing Physical Injury and Article 2 of the U.C.C., supra 
note 63, at 3–4.  
326 Titus, supra note 131, at 760–82. 
327 Markle v. Mulholland’s, Inc., 509 P.2d 529, 536 (O’Connell, C.J., concurring).  
328 Cline v. Prowler Industries of Maryland, Inc., 418 A.2d 968 (Del. 1980). The Cline court 
acknowledged that other states had rejected the preemption argument, but regarded those decisions as 
distinguishable.  
329 Jacobs v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 649 N.E.2d 758, 763 n.6 (Mass. 1995). 
330 Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 968 (Mass. 1978).  
55 
 
courts the opportunity to tinker with the newly adopted U.C.C. Decisions that 
engrossed the U.C.C.’s warranty protections and limited its notice and disclaimer 
provisions might have relieved some of the pressure for a solution for gnawing 
products problems.331 Tellingly, states that embraced robust warranty protections at 
an early juncture lagged behind other jurisdictions in adopting strict products liability 
in tort. Among the states where legislatures enacted warranty protections more 
expansive than those found in the initial version of section 2-318, only Minnesota 
adopted strict products liability in tort during the 1960s, and that state’s high court 
did so in a case that arose before the enhanced warranty protections became 
effective.332 Most of the other Alternative B or Alternative C states took their time in 
recognizing strict products liability in tort. The 17 states to adopt statutory variations 
of Alternative B or C as of the early 1970s account for 11 of the 19 last states to 
adopt strict products liability, and three of the five remaining holdouts.333 Wyoming 
adopted strict products liability in tort only in 1986; Virginia never has. Thus 
pioneers in one area of the law became laggards in another.   
The differences between tort and warranty might seem like mere semantics, 
given how warranty protections have been construed so broadly in Delaware, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, and Virginia as to be essentially equivalent to strict liability 
in tort.334 Even so, the different path taken by these states illustrates how there often 
exists more than one doctrinal route to a generic objective, and that the amount of 
traffic on each of these avenues may depend in large part on idiosyncratic 
circumstances and matters of timing.  
The status of products liability in the one true outlier, North Carolina, offers 
additional instruction on this point. Among warranty states, only North Carolina has 
adopted a truly distinctive approach. North Carolina courts never adopted a torts 
                                                          
331 One such decision was Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 133 N.W. 129 (Mich. 1965). See also 
Whitaker v. Lian Feng Mach. Co., 509 N.E.2d 591 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (allowing a warranty suit by an 
employee of the purchaser); Hyundai Motor America, Inc. v. Goodin, 822 N.E.2d 947, 959 (Ind. 
2005) (abolishing a “vertical privity” requirement); Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d 903, 
904 (Pa. 1974) (abolishing the “horizontal privity” requirement in warranty). 
332 McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 488, 500 n.13 (Minn. 1967). 
333 The laggards were Alabama (1976), Arkansas (1973), Colorado (1975), Kansas (1976), Maine 
(1973), Maryland (1976), North Dakota (1974), South Carolina (1974), South Dakota (1973), Vermont 
(1975), and Wyoming (1986); the holdouts are Delaware, Massachusetts, and Virginia. See supra note 
132 and text accompanying note 136. 
334 See Cline v. Prowler Indus. of Maryland, Inc., 418 A.2d 968, 976 (Del.1980) (“the defenses of 
privity, notice, and disclaimer have, in large measure, become ineffective in consumer product liability 
cases in this State”); Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 969 (Mass. 1978) (“The Legislature has 
made the Massachusetts law of warranty congruent in nearly all respects with the principles expressed 
in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965)”);  Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 268 N.W.2d 291, 
293 (Mich. App. 1978) (“the requisite elements for a cause of action based upon strict liability in tort 
are congruent to those for breach of warranty.”); OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 136, 
at 281–85 (discussing all five states’ approaches toward products liability). 
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approach to strict products liability prior to the enactment of a statute in 1979 that 
made products-liability cases more difficult for plaintiffs to win335 and a 1995 statute 
that expressly prohibited judicial recognition of strict products liability in tort.336 
These developments mean that, more so than any other state, North Carolina still 
relies on negligence and warranty law as rules of decision in products-liability cases.337 
Insofar as claims against product manufacturers are concerned, however, this 
difference does not place many North Carolina plaintiffs in much worse of a 
position than their counterparts elsewhere.338 Since most contemporary products-
liability claims involve design or warning issues,339 where even strict liability has 
gravitated toward what resembles a negligence approach, the burden that North 
Carolina plaintiffs bear is strikingly similar to that cast upon claimants in other states.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
While the conventional history of strict products liability represents the most 
famous tale of doctrinal evolution in tort law, its marginalization of other narratives 
is fairly typical. The three supplemental stories related above have been obscured by 
blind spots and biases that recur across legal histories generally,340 and histories of 
tort law in particular. 
First, there exists a tendency to focus on the obvious. When assigning 
responsibility for shifts in tort law, pioneering judicial opinions, law-review articles, 
                                                          
335 An Act Relating to Civil Actions for Damages for Personal Injury, Death or Damage to Property 
Resulting from the Use of Products, ch. 654, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 687. Among its provisions, this 
statute interposed contributory negligence as a defense to all products-liability actions, whether 
framed in negligence or warranty, id. at § 1, and created a six-year statute of repose, id. at § 2. The 
period before repose has since been increased to 12 years. An Act to Clarify and Reform the Statutes 
of Limitations and Repose in Product Liability Actions, ch. 420, §2, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 808.  
336 An Act to Amend the Law Regarding Products Liability, ch. 522, § 1, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1872, 
1873.  
337 Moore v. Coachmen Industries, Inc., 499 S.E.2d 772, 777 (N.C. App. 1998) (“A products liability 
plaintiff may base the claim on various causes of action, including negligence (negligent design, 
manufacture, assembly, or failure to provide adequate warnings) and breach of warranty.”) See also 
DeWitt v. Eveready Battery Co., 565 S.E.2d 140 (N.C. 2002) (allowing a plaintiff in a products case to 
proceed on an implied warranty theory); Red Hill Hosiery Mill, Inc. v. MagneTek, Inc., 582 S.E.2d 
632 (N.C. App. 2003) (affirming a jury verdict for the plaintiff on an implied-warranty theory). 
338 A more significant hurdle for North Carolina plaintiffs in products cases is the fact that 
contributory negligence (still recognized in that state) represents a defense to all products-liability 
claims, whether framed in negligence or in tort. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-4(3) (2011). 
339 See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Torts 2.0: The Restatement 3rd and the Architecture of Participation in 
American Tort Law, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1582, 1592 (2011) (“defective design . . . came to 
dominate the products liability caseload of courts in the latter part of the twentieth century.”); 
Dominick Vetri, Order out of Chaos: Products Liability Design-Defect Law, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1373, 1375 
(2009) (“Product design defects are the predominate type of litigated [products liability] cases today.”). 
340 See Gordon, supra note 9, at 71 (discussing these tendencies and biases). 
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and treatises all probably receive more credit than they deserve, while the evolution 
of claim consciousness of prospective plaintiffs and the capabilities and interests of 
their attorneys often do not receive enough attention.341 This “top-down” bias 
follows from the relative visibility and measurability of these influences. The former 
contributions are memorialized in print, and their influence readily gleaned from 
citation counts.342 The existence and importance of the latter must be inferred 
obliquely from facts and circumstances that may not stand out in the historical 
record. But the fact that these forces are difficult to detect does not mean that they 
are irrelevant to doctrinal change. Quite the contrary; as related above, without 
plaintiffs and counsel, courts would lack both raw material with which to work, and a 
sense of urgency in their task. 
For similar reasons, it is easy to underestimate the importance of old case 
tropes whose significance lay not in the novelty in their facts, but instead in the 
frequency with which they appeared. Bottle cases were bread-and-butter matters for 
the personal-injury attorneys of the 1940s and 1950s, and judges of that era certainly 
knew about these cases and the problems they presented. The prosaic nature of these 
disputes and their subsequent disappearance has erased them from the popular 
consciousness. This invisibility, combined with the seeming indignity of attributing 
broad doctrinal shifts to particular case tropes, has meant that bottle cases are 
assigned no credit in the development of strict products liability. This omission 
seems wrong, for the same reason that it would seem improper for a history of 
Colonial times to entirely ignore facts such as slower communication networks, 
shorter lifespans, and the prevalence of since-eradicated diseases. Just as these 
conditions influenced how the people of a time viewed their world, bottle cases were 
an important part of the Traynor’s and Prosser’s environments. It seems hardly 
coincidental that for good or for ill, the products-liability framework that Prosser 
devised was perfectly attuned to the difficulties associated with bottle cases. 
Furthermore, not many courts would have felt compelled to adopt strict products 
liability in tort had judges regarded this approach as applicable to only a handful of 
disparate cases. Bottle lawsuits provided both a face and a center of gravity to a 
polyglot array of products matters. By instantiating and grounding the argument for a 
strict-liability approach, these cases may have helped persuade courts that the reform 
game was worth the candle.  
Finally, the history of strict products liability provides additional evidence of 
another bias—an overeagerness to treat doctrinal change as inevitable, once it 
already has happened.343 It seems likely that by the Atomic Age, circumstances had 
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343 Id. at 71. 
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aligned so as to guarantee some additional protections to the consumer. But it was 
not similarly preordained that these protections would be cast in the language of 
“pure” tort law, as opposed to warranty. Had circumstances changed only modestly, 
perhaps ten or more states would have preferred to continue to tinker with the 
prevailing warranty rules, instead of making the leap to a “pure” tort solution. If so, 
the products-liability landscape today might resemble the division of authority 
regarding landowner liability, with a rough equilibrium having been reached between 
states that retain a “traditional” approach (tempered by exceptions that avoid undue 
hardships for worthy plaintiffs) and those that have modernized their law to 
recognize a duty of reasonable care owed to an engrossed cohort of entrants upon 
the land (also subject to various exceptions).344  
To draw a concluding metaphor, by recognizing and accounting for these 
blind spots and biases, one can appreciate that strict products liability in tort was, in 
effect, a product itself. Doctrinal advances made in early cases involving food 
products and exploding bottles served as prototypes for further innovation, and 
effectively “auditioned” this innovation for a broader audience. Consumers and their 
attorneys provided the raw case materials through which judges adopted strict 
liability, as this doctrine had been packaged by academics. And just as seemingly 
unimportant inflection points have proven pivotal in resolving other technological 
rivalries,345 strict liability in tort prevailed over a warranty-based theory of products 
liability theory as much because of quirks of fate than due to any material, inarguable 
superiority of a “pure” tort approach.  
 
 
                                                          
344 See Robert L. Rabin, Rowland v. Christian: Hallmark of an Expansionary Era, in TORTS STORIES, supra 
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345 See, e.g., Michael A. Cusumano et al., Strategic Maneuvering and Mass-Market Dynamics: The Triumph of 
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